...between the Church of England and the Church of Reform and/or Conservative Judaism. (Although, based on the dvar Torah I heard this Shabbos in the local presumably Orthodox shull... well, never mind...) Starting 0:30:
“...theology is a device for enabling the agnostics to stay within the Church.”
— One of them wants to get G-d out of Church of England, and the other one wants to get the Queen out.
— Well, the Queen is inseparable from the Church of England.
— I see. What about G-d?
— I think He is what’s called “an optional extra”.
See also this, starting from 1:26:
— I’ve heard he is very religious.
— Well, it’s all right for a bishop, is it not?
Saturday, April 24, 2010
Friday, April 23, 2010
An inner compas
One usually hears a reference to an inner moral compass. There is, however, also such a phenomenon as an inner fashion compass. Now, I personally seem to be sadly lacking one, as most people who have seen me dressed during the week (and not on a formal occasion) can testify.
Seeing this picture, however —
[censored]
— has reminded even me of this compilation.
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Yes, I suppose that is a bit old for shidduch. On the other hand, I would say nothing is that old in reality. Not even Atik Yomin.
Interesting fact of life: hot air goes up, but ice cream, when it melts, goes down.
Also, the latest poll has finished. Unlike the last time, when most of my readers turned out to be heretics, this poll revealed that most of my readers are fanatics. Some are religious fanatics, and some are secular fanatics (fortunately, fewer than the religious ones).
To a question: “Can a tzaddik be wrong?”, 55% answered: “He cannot be wrong about anything”, 23% answered: “He can be wrong about anything”. Only a mere minority gave the more moderate answers: “He cannot be wrong, but he can be less right” (which was my official answer) — only 3 votes (13%), and “He can be wrong, but not about Torah” — only 2 votes (including my own vote from my work computer), or 9%.
I am not going to say that the prevalent fanaticism amongst the readers of this blog is good or bad; I just think it’s interesting.
Please answer the new poll.
Thursday, April 22, 2010
Trees behind the forest

(click on the image to enlarge)
The picture above (source; courtesy of e) reminded me of a statement by the Rogatchover Gaon: “People say there are seventy faces in Torah. But I see ten faces. And if I was smarter, I would see only one face.” Meaning, the smarter and the more erudite in Torah (not to mention the holier) one is, the more one sees Torah not as a bunch of details, but as a small number of klalim (principles, main ideas).
I thought recently while studying Gemara with my chavrusa that this goal is important to keep in mind not just for the whole Torah but even for a small sugya.
(Also, check out “How the Rebbe saw Torah” to hear how one talmid chochom who would come to discuss nigleh with the Rebbe said that the Rebbe is like Rambam.)
On the other hand, I remember a statement by my local rabbi that if there is an inherent danger in studying deep sugyas of Chassidus, then it is in focusing on the “grand scheme” and losing sight of the everyday, simple things. Like thinking how by giving tzedaka one creates giluim in Atzilus, or achdus of Soveiv and Memalei, or Dira b’tachtoinim, but not thinking about the fact that you are simply helping another Jew.
I know, the immediate answer from most people is: well, the two are connected. Can’t have one without the other. And so on. And, yes, that is how it is supposed to be, but my point is: it is easy to loose sight of this.
There is a famous story with Alter Rebbe and Mitteler Rebbe. The latter’s little son once fell out of his crib and was crying. Mitteler Rebbe, who was sitting nearby, was so engrossed in his learning that he didn’t realize that his son was crying. Alter Rebbe came in from another room, picked up the child and calmed him. Then he told Mitteler Rebbe that “however deeply one is absorbed in study, prayer, or the performance of mitzvos, one must always have an ear open to the cries of a Jewish child”.
There is a similar story of Alter Rebbe being a chazan on Yom Kippur. In the middle of Neila, the holiest prayer of the day, when the essence of one’s soul becomes truly united with the Essence of G-d, he stopped, took off his talles and left the shull. On the outskirts of the town a woman had given birth to a child. Alter Rebbe chopped some wood, lit up fire and cooked a soup for the woman.
Wednesday, April 21, 2010
Growing up quickly
View Krasnoyarsk in a larger map
A recent post from TRS made me think about how normally we excuse teenagers from their immature behavior by stating that they are, in fact, immature and have underdeveloped frontal cortices. (Most people perhaps don't phrase it this way, but the two statements are in fact congruent. Just like saying "he is not bar-mitzva yet" and "his body has not started its testosterone production fully".)
And yet we find stories of teenagers acting in a very responsible manner (oftentimes much more responsibly than many adults) when suddenly faced with responsibilities. The stories that come to my mind (because of my background) are of children during WWII. Somehow being left in blockaded Leningrad (where a few thousand people are dying every day from cold and starvation and cannibalism is prevalent) makes one grow up very quickly.
Actually, my mother has recently befriended a young Russian couple. The husband's grandmother was 15 or 16 when the war started. Her father died in battle. So did her mother (the Soviets were very egalitarian those days). She had a younger sister and a younger brother. When the shelling of Moscow by Nazis started, she picked her siblings up and left. Where did she go? Well, she remembered that she had some relatives in Krasnoyarsk, so she went there, by foot. In the middle of winter. Where, you ask, is Krasnoyarsk? Well, just a bit north of Mongolia. The distance is about equivalent to that between Mexico City and Alaska (see the map above). Again, I repeat, in winter. Traveling on the roads so bad that German tanks had trouble getting through them (and this was on the European side of Russia; she had to go through the Asian side).
Not to mention all the 16-year-olds who fought in the army against Nazis. And the 15-year-olds who forged their dates of birth so that they could join.
Now, these are not stories of exceptional heroism. Such acts were commonplace. People did what they had to do. And not just in shelled Moscow. In shelled London too. In shelled Warsaw. In concentration camps. Each culture equivalent to its needs and its people's strength of character. Children nowadays are doing the same things in Africa, in India, in China, in the US South, when they have to.
So, I wonder: do their prefrontal cortices speed up in development? Or do they just do the right thing, not making excuses of maturity and anatomy?
Also (and this is really an old question of mine for those who are keeping track), what should the modern parents do? Surely we should not wish upon our children to encounter difficulties in life (the life will take care of that by itself). But certainly living in a golden bubble also has its averse affects.
Tuesday, April 20, 2010
Diplomacy vs. politics
It is simply too dangerous to let the politicians deal with diplomacy. Diplomacy is about surviving until the next century. Politics is about surviving until the Friday afternoon.
A fascinating clip about how democracy and politics vs. international relations works. Thanks to TRS for pointing it out to me. Now, this particular part interested me:
What fun! Well, surely UK have always been a bit self-centered, thinking it still determines which way the winds of the planet blow. It can’t be helped, I suppose.
The best part is the conversation of Bernard with the Foreign Office members starting at 4:00.
Of course, political games are the only thing that UK can do nowadays. US can resort to different tactics (starting 2:03):
— I have it from the ambassador in Washington that Americans are going to support the current government of St. George’s Island.(There must have been a Republican president in office in the show’s timeline.)
— In the UN?
— No. In battle. On the St. George’s Island. They’ll send 7th Airborn Division backed up by fleet.
Volcano and Mt. Sinai
Volcanoes are well-liked in my family. My mother has ascended on a bunch of volcanoes of Kuril islands (Iturup, Kunashir, etc.). And a book about volcanoes was actually the first book I have ever read on my own.
Anyway, many people arguing against revelation at Sinai say that perhaps it was a volcano. Seeing the footage above, it is easy to see why these people are confused, mistakenly thinking that the ancient Jews could be confused. In other words (source):
Here is the proposed "explanation" of the belief in revelation at Sinai in terms of myth formation. Maybe the Jewish people were in the desert and there was a volcanic eruption or an earthquake. These are very startling events. These are very shocking events. They might even have been regarded as supernatural. Then maybe later people told them that they heard voices, saw visions and so on, and all of that elevated into the story of Revelation. This is the sort of "explanation" which myth formation offers. Here too the "explanation" suffers from both implausibility and lack of parallels.
1. In order to see how implausible the "explanation" is, let's take it in two stages. For the first stage, imagine that the story says of itself that it has been passed down continuously from the time of the event. In other words, the story says: "So-and-so many years ago the entire ancestry of your nation stood at a mountain and heard G-d speaking to them. They were commanded to tell the story of this event to their children, and they to their children, and the nation in fact did this." (There actually is something like this in the Torah itself - cf. Deut. 4:9-10, 31: 9-13, 19-21. But I will not use this below because it is not clear and prominent enough.)
Now we have to imagine a gradual process of taking a natural event and promoting it into a national revelation, ending with the story that this national revelation was always known by the nation. But before you arrive at the story of a national revelation no one knows about it! How are we supposed to imagine that the universal knowledge of the story is promoted gradually?
Now for the second stage, suppose that the story does not say that is was passed down continuously, but that the reader or listener will automatically assume that it will be passed down continuously. Then we have precisely the same problem as the last paragraph: how can a story which the listener assumes must have been continuously known be promoted gradually? This is the Kuzari's point: a story of a national revelation will not be forgotten, and the listener to whom the story is being sold knows this and will use it in evaluating the story and deciding whether to believe it. The problem of filling in the details of the gradual promotion of such a story is a great obstacle to the hypothesis of myth formation.
2. Now for the second problem, the lack of historical parallels. If the belief in the revelation at Sinai is the result of myth formation applied to a natural event, and if that is a normal sort of thing to happen, then it ought to happen more than once. We are not the only people in history that have witnessed earthquakes or who saw volcanic eruptions, or to whom typhoons took place, or tidal waves or other events that could be regarded as supernatural. If a belief in a public revelation could be produced by a natural event, it should have been produced more than once. It is very suspicious to say that here is a effect of a natural cause, a normal cause, fitting in well with human psychology and the normal human environment, but it only happened once in the history of the world!
This is especially true with respect to a belief like this, because a belief in a public revelation is the strongest possible foundation for a religion. If somebody goes up on a mountain and says that he heard G-d speak, either you believe him or you don’t believe him. It is then open for everyone else to doubt it and to say that he either made it up or had delusions. It is much more powerful logically to start out with a belief that an entire nation heard G-d speak.
Now if that kind of belief could have been made up then it should have been made up more than once. After all, it is logically the most sound foundation for a religion. In addition, ancient religions borrowed from one another, they were in contact with one another, they had a similar structure; they have the same sort of Pantheon, the same sorts of beliefs. Why wasn’t this element ever borrowed? Our belief goes back at least three thousand years. There was a lot of travel through our area of the world. How is it that no one picked it up?
Thirdly, Christianity and Islam desperately need this belief. Christianity and Islam in their early stages made strenuous efforts to convert Jews. Now, if you are a Christian or a Moslem missionary and you come to a Jew and you tell him that your leader is G-d, or that your leader is a Prophet and so forth, the Jew responds: “I don’t know about your leader, all I know is that my ancestors stood at Sinai, and you agree. You Christian, you Moslem agree that my ancestors stood at Sinai. How can I now abandon that? How can I contradict that?” What shall the Christian or Moslem answer? That is one of the reasons that they did so poorly in converting Jews. Because the Revelation at Sinai is a foundation that is very difficult to contradict.
Now, according to myth formation there would have been a perfect answer that the Christian or Moslem could have given. He could have said: “You are right, your ancestors stood at Sinai, but it happened again. Another public revelation. All of your ancestors, five hundred years ago, stood again at another mountain and heard the second edition, and we have the second edition.” Why did they not make up that kind of belief? If this is the kind of belief that you can make up, why didn’t they make it up?
So, if you are working on a scenario about how the original belief of the Revelation took place, you have an enormous obstacle to overcome. The more plausible your scenario is, the more difficult it is to explain why it didn’t happen to anybody else. You are sort of caught between two improbable alternatives. Either you create a very implausible scenario so as to protect yourself from the fact that no one else did it, but then it is implausible as an explanation as to how it happened to us. Or you create a very plausible scenario, in which case the question why no one else ever did it is simply impossible to answer.
Monday, April 19, 2010
The best profession
— You... uh... don’t know how I can raise fifty quid somehow, do you?
— Work?
— Bertie!.. No, I must think of some way. I need to put at least fifty quid on Ocean Breeze.
A microscope that is used as a door stop is a sadly lacking in the full expression of its potential. The same is true regarding a human being — not in the sense of one being a door stop, but in the sense of one not fully expressing the essence of what makes him unique amongst all creatures.
A philosopher (to use the term loosely) once pondered what professions express this potential to its fullest and reached a conclusion that they are those that require thinking, research or creativity. E.g., the profession of a scientist or a mathematician. Or the profession of an artist, a writer, or a musician. Of course, any profession can allow a person to express both his intelligence and creativity, and by participating in this profession then a person does not only earn a living but lives up to his title of a human being, a Homo sapiens (“a thinking person” literally — to differentiate one from Homo erectus, whose main distinction from the rest of the animal kingdom is in his upright posture).
Another philosopher, upon listening to the first one list the professions, remarked: “Surely you are forgetting the best profession of all — that of an heir.” More about it here (starting 0:54).
All of the above refers to the nations of the world. What about the Jews?
Well, although being a thinking and creative individual is of course a virtuous characteristic for a Jew, it does not touch the essence of who he is. Rabbi Gottlieb remarks that after having been introduced to someone at a cocktail party, the first questions to ask him or her are: “Where are you from?” and “What do you do [for a living]?” Because there is a difference between speaking to a person from California and from Texas. And there is a difference between speaking to a plumber and a cardiologist (despite the superficially similar nature of their professions).
Nevertheless, finding out about a frum Jew’s profession is useless. Avraham Avinu was a shepherd. Hillel chopped wood. Rashi was a wine merchant. Rambam was a doctor. The Lubavitcher Rebbe was an electric engineer. Therefore what?
My point goes beyond the fact that learning Torah and observance of mitzvos (and levels of and views on thereof) define frum Jews much better than the methods for earning a living. Returning to the above statement that being an intelligent and creative being defines the essence of who a human being is, one can say that being a servant of Hashem defines the essence of who a Jew is.
A Jewish soul is a part of G-d’s Essence. It resides in the upper spiritual realms and then descends into this world with but one purpose: to make it a dwelling place for G-d. It must learn Torah in this world, and it must do mitzvos with the objects of this world. For this purpose it must interact with the world — and according to the philosophy of Chabad, we do not shy away from this interaction. But to allow the world define and shape who we are, on any level, is foolish. If that happens, G-d forbid, then a Jew is worse than a microscope being used a door step. Because there is a finite distance (however great) between a microscope’s design and that of a stone, but the difference between the essence of G-d and this world is infinite.
It is up to us whether we live up to our fullest potential in our lives. And I don’t mean by the end of our lives. I mean every single moment we are in this world.
Saturday, April 17, 2010
The necessity to learn Chassidus

(Tzemach Tzedek, the 3rd Rebbe of Chabad-Lubavitch)
In Derech Mitzvosecho, the Tzemach Tzedek differentiates between the opinion of those who list mitzvas ha’amanas Elokus (commandment of faith in G-d) among the 613 mitzvos and those who do not, deeming it a general principle, but nevertheless not a commandment.
People belonging to the second group, Rebbe the Tzemach Tzedek explains, argue that one cannot command to believe in G-d, since first we must believe in G-d and only after can we make a choice to fulfill His Commandments. Secondly, existence of G-d is a self-evident fact, both from observation of the world and from our tradition based on evidence of the whole Jewish nation. Furthermore, using a deeper definition of faith, one cannot command to have feelings coming from knowledge of G-d’s existence and the fact that G-d is the source of all life, since once one has such knowledge, the feelings are automatic.
The counter-argument of the opinion that faith is indeed one of the commandments is that:
a) once a person is distracted, his natural feelings of love to G-d, due to above-mentioned knowledge of His being the source of the life, can dissipate; therefore, one must work on them constantly;
b) even though it is an easy task to know that G-d exists, it is incumbent upon every person to deepen that knowledge — which would include both philosophical proofs of G-d’s existence, which a person is commanded to study in detail, as well as kabbalistic and chassidic explanations of what G-d’s existence is and multiple levels within it;
c) even after having studied the above, we are still commanded to believe — with pure faith — about those aspects of G-dliness which are not accessible to the grasp of our intellect in a form of philosophical proofs. This refers to the Unity and transcendence of G-d, relationship of His Essence with His attributes (sefiros); the concepts of lack of change in His Unity and Simplicity, the reasons for His creation of the world, etc., etc. — all the concepts elucidated in detail in Chassidus.
We are required to believe in these concepts with faith, coming from the faith in tzaddikim and specifically our Rebbeim who revealed these concepts to us through ruach ha’koidesh, and we are required to study them in detail. This is all included in the mitzva of faith in G-d and knowledge of greatness of G-d.
More about the topic:
“Are Jews required by Halacha to study Chassidus?”
“Is everyone obligated to study Chassidus?”
You can start your study of the some of the above-mentioned topics by starting to learn:
Sha’ar HaYichud v’HaEmunoh (Gate of Unity and Faith), by Alter Rebbe
Sha’ar HaYichud (Gate of Unity), by Mitteler Rebbe, starting Ch. 7 and on
Ma’amorim of Frierdiker Rebbe
Likkutei Sichos by the Rebbe
Ma’amor Bosi LeGani by Frierdiker Rebbe and the Rebbe
Ch. 20 of Iggeres HaKoidesh by Alter Rebbe
Thursday, April 15, 2010
The art of proposing
I know a chossid (married for ten years already and with children, b"H) who, when the time came to propose to his kallah, asked her: “Would you like to go to the Ohel with me?” He thought himself incredibly smooth. His wife (as she confessed much later, with her husband sitting there) was thinking: “What a loser.”
Here is another excerpt from Three Men on a Bummel, this time regarding proposing. I must say, this method seems much smoother than the one above, although not without inherent dangers. It is also an example of how American English sounded to me (in terms of comprehensibility) when I just came to this here country:
Here is another excerpt from Three Men on a Bummel, this time regarding proposing. I must say, this method seems much smoother than the one above, although not without inherent dangers. It is also an example of how American English sounded to me (in terms of comprehensibility) when I just came to this here country:
A story is told of a Scotchman who, loving a lassie, desired her for his wife. But he possessed the prudence of his race. He had noticed in his circle many an otherwise promising union result in disappointment and dismay, purely in consequence of the false estimate formed by bride or bridegroom concerning the imagined perfectability of the other. He determined that in his own case no collapsed ideal should be possible. Therefore, it was that his proposal took the following form:
“I’m but a puir lad, Jennie; I hae nae siller to offer ye, and nae land.”
“Ah, but ye hae yoursel’, Davie!”
“An’ I’m wishfu’ it wa’ onything else, lassie. I’m nae but a puir ill-seasoned loon, Jennie.”
“Na, na; there’s mony a lad mair ill-looking than yoursel’, Davie.”
“I hae na seen him, lass, and I’m just a-thinkin’ I shouldna’ care to.”
“Better a plain man, Davie, that ye can depend a’ than ane that would be a speirin’ at the lassies, a-bringin’ trouble into the hame wi’ his flouting ways.”
“Dinna ye reckon on that, Jennie; it’s nae the bonniest Bubbly Jock that mak’s the most feathers to fly in the kailyard. I was ever a lad to run after the petticoats, as is weel kent; an’ it’s a weary handfu’ I’ll be to ye, I’m thinkin’.”
“Ah, but ye hae a kind heart, Davie! an’ ye love me weel. I’m sure on’t.”
“I like ye weel enoo’, Jennie, though I canna say how long the feeling may bide wi’ me; an’ I’m kind enoo’ when I hae my ain way, an’ naethin’ happens to put me oot. But I hae the deevil’s ain temper, as my mither call tell ye, an’ like my puir fayther, I’m a-thinkin’, I’ll grow nae better as I grow mair auld.”
“Ay, but ye’re sair hard upon yersel’, Davie. Ye’re an honest lad. I ken ye better than ye ken yersel’, an’ ye’ll mak a guid hame for me.”
“Maybe, Jennie! But I hae my doots. It’s a sair thing for wife an’ bairns when the guid man canna keep awa’ frae the glass; an’ when the scent of the whusky comes to me it’s just as though I hae’d the throat o’ a Loch Tay salmon; it just gaes doon an’ doon, an’ there’s nae filling o’ me.”
“Ay, but ye’re a guid man when ye’re sober, Davie.”
“Maybe I’ll be that, Jennie, if I’m nae disturbed.”
“An’ ye’ll bide wi’ me, Davie, an’ work for me?”
“I see nae reason why I shouldna bide wi’ yet Jennie; but dinna ye clack aboot work to me, for I just canna bear the thoct o’t.”
“Anyhow, ye’ll do your best, Davie? As the minister says, nae man can do mair than that.”
“An’ it’s a puir best that mine’ll be, Jennie, and I’m nae sae sure ye’ll hae ower muckle even o’ that. We’re a’ weak, sinfu’ creatures, Jennie, an’ ye’d hae some deefficulty to find a man weaker or mair sinfu’ than mysel’.”
“Weel, weel, ye hae a truthfu’ tongue, Davie. Mony a lad will mak fine promises to a puir lassie, only to break ’em an’ her heart wi’ ’em. Ye speak me fair, Davie, and I’m thinkin’ I’ll just tak ye, an’ see what comes o’t.”
Concerning what did come of it, the story is silent, but one feels that under no circumstances had the lady any right to complain of her bargain. Whether she ever did or did not—for women do not invariably order their tongues according to logic, nor men either for the matter of that—Davie, himself, must have had the satisfaction of reflecting that all reproaches were undeserved.
In tandem

Recently, I have quoted to you a story about a young couple so engrossed in a conversation that they lost track of their surroundings. Here is a similar story, but with different details.
I just want to remark on the effect that marriage has on one. Before marriage, it is likely to be so focused on one’s date as to lose sense of one’s boat. After the marriage, it becomes more likely to become focused on one’s bicycle and ignore the loss of one’s wife.
Other remarks, such as one regarding men and female dresses, are also true.
Actually, last summer, when I was in Catskill Mountains, I saw a young Breslover couple (a man and a woman) on a tandem bike. They seemed to be enjoying themselves quite a bit. As I continued going downhill (this was in the Lake Minewaska area), I saw another, slightly less enthusiastic couple: a large yeshivish-looking fellow, in a suit, going up the hill, accompanied by another yeshivish man of much thinner complexion. The men were eying people coming down the hill suspiciously, but seeing a kindred spirit in me (I was wearing my beard that day), asked me how far to the top.
And now the story:
Common sense is most uncommon...
... and eidelkeit is even more so.
I've heard recently that the Frierdiker Rebbe wrote in the description of his grandmother, Rebbetzin Rivka, the wife of Rebbe Maharash, that she had six children, and nobody in the home ever raised a voice. The parents never raised their voices at the children, the children never raised their voiced at their parents, and the children never raised their voices at each other. [Saying that the parents never raised their voices at each other is unnecessary.] Why? Because they were afraid? Because they were refined people.
This is what is fascinating about this parsha. Parshas Tazria talks about the concept of ritual impurity. It is a very eidel subject. To understand this subject, a person must be above viewing the world and Yiddishkeit in purely physical terms. And “physical” doesn't mean just physical pleasures or physical phenomena. “Physical” also means interpreting something spiritual as a metaphor only, without seeing the ruchnius in the concept — the literal, “mamosh”, ruchnius.
To appreciate these concepts, a person needs to be refined. And one thing about a person who is not refined is: he doesn’t know he is not refined. You tell such a person that listening to a certain kind of music, reading certain kind of literature, consuming certain food or drink makes him less refined, and he says: “Why? Where? I don’t see it.” Of course he doesn’t see it. A person who is used to eating at McDonalds doesn’t appreciate the difference between fast food and fine food anymore.
Rabbi Paltiel says: an eidel person speaks softly. Someone who speaks loudly and makes grub jokes doesn’t understand what is wrong with him. He doesn’t understand why it makes the other person uncomfortable. He says: “You’re afraid of your own shadow.” The other person is not afraid; he just finds grubkeit distasteful.
This is the difference between tikkun ha’middos through derech of Chassidus and through other means. By learning Chassidus, through exposure to G-dliness, the person becomes more refined himself and gains a deeper insight into eidelkeit, on all levels. To such a person saying that one should be sensitive to another human being is not necessary. Such a person doesn’t need to force himself to stop over-indulging in physical pleasures or to stay away from a bad company: he is naturally repulsed by such things.
I find this story, which I received today through e-mail, fascinating:
I've heard recently that the Frierdiker Rebbe wrote in the description of his grandmother, Rebbetzin Rivka, the wife of Rebbe Maharash, that she had six children, and nobody in the home ever raised a voice. The parents never raised their voices at the children, the children never raised their voiced at their parents, and the children never raised their voices at each other. [Saying that the parents never raised their voices at each other is unnecessary.] Why? Because they were afraid? Because they were refined people.
This is what is fascinating about this parsha. Parshas Tazria talks about the concept of ritual impurity. It is a very eidel subject. To understand this subject, a person must be above viewing the world and Yiddishkeit in purely physical terms. And “physical” doesn't mean just physical pleasures or physical phenomena. “Physical” also means interpreting something spiritual as a metaphor only, without seeing the ruchnius in the concept — the literal, “mamosh”, ruchnius.
To appreciate these concepts, a person needs to be refined. And one thing about a person who is not refined is: he doesn’t know he is not refined. You tell such a person that listening to a certain kind of music, reading certain kind of literature, consuming certain food or drink makes him less refined, and he says: “Why? Where? I don’t see it.” Of course he doesn’t see it. A person who is used to eating at McDonalds doesn’t appreciate the difference between fast food and fine food anymore.
Rabbi Paltiel says: an eidel person speaks softly. Someone who speaks loudly and makes grub jokes doesn’t understand what is wrong with him. He doesn’t understand why it makes the other person uncomfortable. He says: “You’re afraid of your own shadow.” The other person is not afraid; he just finds grubkeit distasteful.
This is the difference between tikkun ha’middos through derech of Chassidus and through other means. By learning Chassidus, through exposure to G-dliness, the person becomes more refined himself and gains a deeper insight into eidelkeit, on all levels. To such a person saying that one should be sensitive to another human being is not necessary. Such a person doesn’t need to force himself to stop over-indulging in physical pleasures or to stay away from a bad company: he is naturally repulsed by such things.
I find this story, which I received today through e-mail, fascinating:
The chossid Reb Peretz Chein would often use the following משל at farbrengens: The chefs in the Czar's royal kitchen were busy preparing a lavish meal of stuffed calf for the visiting Kaiser William of Germany, the Czar's relative. Their efforts were very successful, and the Kaiser highly praised the dish, asking for the recipe so that his cooks would be able to serve him this extraordinary delicacy. The Czar ordered the chief chef to write a detailed list of ingredients and instructions, and Kaiser William left Russia for Germany looking forward to having such a delightful meal again. As soon as he arrived home, the Kaiser handed the recipe to his chef, asking him to prepare it for dinner. When the kitchen doors opened and the carefully prepared dish was served to the eagerly waiting Kaiser, he cried out, "What an unpleasant odor is coming from the food!" and the platter was quickly removed from the table.Of course, it is possible for a person to learn Chassidus for 25 years or more and still remain unrefined. Regarding this, the e-mail says:
Quite disappointed, Kaiser William wrote to the Czar demanding to know why his chefs could not produce the same delicacy, although they had carefully followed the recipe. The Czar asked his chef for a possible explanation, and after thinking for a moment, the chef burst out laughing: "It's quite simple! I hadn't included in my instructions that the intestines be burned inside out and washed thoroughly before being spiced and stuffed. It seemed unnecessary to mention something so obvious, but apparently it wasn't so obvious to the German chefs."
The Frierdiker Rebbe said: Chassidus must make one into a chossid with chassidishe middos; otherwise, it can be called "חכמה" but not "חסידות". The path of chassidus is a broad and paved path; it is the fault of those young chassidim who learn chassidus in self made ways, that the clear path of chassidus is blocked. This is the result of learning without עבודה. [...]
Reb Lazer, one of the Alter Rebbe's chassidim, once stopped a yungerman who was walking down the street holding his tallis bag. "What are you thinking about now?" he asked. When the young man did not answer, he continued, "I'll tell you. You are thinking that though currently you are not conducting yourself in a manner that chassidus expects of you, when you will grow older, you will surely live up to those expectations. Well, I too entertained such thoughts when I was young, but experience has taught me that I was wrong! One must put effort into ’עבודת ה from a young age."
You need Light
When encountering the difference between Chakirah (Jewish philosophy) and Kabbala, one can ask the question: what’s the purpose of Light? After studying Chassidus, one can ask a more eidel question: if everything is about the Essence of G-d, and, indeed, only about this world, again, what’s the need for Light, intellectual understanding of the deeper aspects of a mitzva and emotions while performing the mitzva? If we reach G-d’s Essence through the physical deed itself, what else is needed?
Excerpt from Inyonei Toras HaChassidus. The second and third paragraphs are my focus; the first one is for the context. (The Rebbe is discussing the concept of acquiring a physical object through one’s daled amos. For more detail, see here.)
____________________
¹ In the above-mentioned sicho, the Rebbe says:
Excerpt from Inyonei Toras HaChassidus. The second and third paragraphs are my focus; the first one is for the context. (The Rebbe is discussing the concept of acquiring a physical object through one’s daled amos. For more detail, see here.)
[T]he Yechida manifests itself (not only in the purification of the physical object which is outside the person; but also) in the different levels of the soul itself, the four levels of Nefesh, Ruach, Neshama, and Chaya. Only through them does the Yechida affect the physical object that is outside the person (though the arousal of the Yechida comes solely because of the purification [Birur] of the physical object).A more detailed explanation here (and in the whole sicha).
A parallel of this phenomenon can be seen in the power of the Essence of G-d, “whose Existence comes from Himself” [i.e., the Essence of G-d is the only level that does not derive its origins and sustenance from other than itself: it is its own source]. Though this power is specifically expressed through the creation of a physical being¹, nevertheless, eliciting this power of Essence into an independent being comes only through the Light, “the Light is that which mediates between True Being and created being. Thus, through the mediation of the Light, the power of Essence is enabled to bring about the existence of a ‘thing’ from complete and utter nothingness.” (Ma’amar “Yechayenu” 5694, ch. 14 [Sefer HaMa'amorim 5711 p. 391]; see also Iggeres HaKodesh Sect. XX.)
Similarly in the individual’s service: though the manifestation of Essence comes through the fulfillment of the mitzvos of action, nevertheless the manner of drawing the Essence into the performance of mitzvos is only through the inner powers: Intellect and Emotions. (See Likutei Sichos 111, p. 956, that for this reason Love and Fear are called “the paths of G-d”. Examine there further in detail.)
____________________
¹ In the above-mentioned sicho, the Rebbe says:
Wednesday, April 14, 2010
Be balanced; importance of emunas tzaddikim

(Frierdiker Rebbe)
I am reminded this morning of the following statement by the Kotzker Rebbe:
“A gutter iz a nar. A klugger iz an appikores. Un a frummer iz a rasha. Alle drei tsuzammen — a shtikel mentch.” — “A good person is a fool. A smart person is a heretic. And a religious person is cruel. All three together — you got yourself a mentch.”
Meaning, if you’re a kind person without intelligence or piety, you’ll be taken advantage of. If you’re a smart person without piety or kindness, you’ll analyze everything to the point of every idea crumbling into ashes and become a heretic, and if you’re pious, but not kind or intelligent, you’ll judge everyone and everything too severely. Combine them — and you have a chance to pass as a functional Jew.
* * *
Another story which I am reminded of this morning is about talmidim of Baal Shem Tov, sitting around the table, listening to him giving kavanos for tkias ha’shoifer (blowing of the shofar) and mikveh. Then the students realized that what Baal Shem Tov was teaching contradicted the teachings of Arizal. None of them said anything, of course, and Baal Shem Tov himself didn’t say anything. One of Baal Shem Tov students, Reb Nochum (incidentally, a grandfather of Rav Nachman Breslover), who was a tzaddik gomur, found himself falling asleep. (The reason it’s mentioned that he was a tzaddik gommur, is that if normally he wanted to stay awake, his body could not tell him otherwise. So, this was not a normal occasion.)
As he fell asleep, he saw a dream. He was in Gan Eiden, and all the souls were running. He stopped one and asked: “Where is everyone running?”, and the soul answered: “What do you mean? Reb Yisroel Baal Shem Tov is going to give a chiddush in Torah.” So, Reb Nochum followed the souls and arrived at the place, where his teacher was standing and giving a lesson identical to the one Reb Nochum saw in the physical world.
Then, a young man with a black beard stood up and started arguing with Baal Shem Tov. And Baal Shem Tov argued back. After a while, the young man said: “You are right” and sat down.
At that moment, Reb Nochum woke up. Baal Shem Tov looked at him, smiled, and asked: “Nu? Ver iz gerekht?” (“Nu? Who is right?”)
Do you enjoy speaking like immigrants?
This was one of the funniest comments to this post:
And now on the topic:
“I know nothing.”
“I learn it from a book.”
“Uno, dos, tres”.
“Si.”
“Fuego!”
“Typical of this place...”
“Don’t panic!”
“What else is there to do?”
Please speak English and use the verb “let” with an object, i.e. “My husband doesn’t let ME.” Do you enjoy speaking like immigrants??? Well, yes, I guess you do. But is doesn’t say much for your education or your job prospects.I must say, I have always enjoyed speaking like an immigrant. I also enjoy walking, eating and drinking like an immigrant.
And now on the topic:
“I know nothing.”
“I learn it from a book.”
“Uno, dos, tres”.
“Si.”
“Fuego!”
“Typical of this place...”
“Don’t panic!”
“What else is there to do?”
Tuesday, April 13, 2010
DNA on PGW
Douglas Adams was incredibly funny. Some might also find him offensive, but not in American or Russian bullying way, but in that English, refined method.
One my favorite parts from the Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy is:
One my favorite parts from the Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy is:
Well, here is Douglas Adams on P.G. Wodehouse and a few others in English literature. Prepare to be offended.
"Whhhrrrr…" said Arthur Dent. He opened his eyes.
"It's dark," he said.
"Yes," said Ford Prefect, "it's dark."
"No light," said Arthur Dent. "Dark, no light."
One of the things Ford Prefect had always found hardest to understand about human beings was their habit of continually stating and repeating the obvious, as in "It's a nice day", or "You're very tall", or "Oh dear, you seem to have fallen down a thirty-foot well, are you alright?" At first Ford had formed a theory to account for this strange behaviour. If human beings don't keep exercising their lips, he thought, their mouths probably seize up. After a few months' consideration and observation he abandoned this theory in favour of a new one. If they don't keep on exercising their lips, he thought, their brains start working. After a while he abandoned this one as well as being obstructively cynical and decided he quite liked human beings after all, but he always remained desperately worried about the terrible number of things they didn't know about.
"Yes," he agreed with Arthur, "no light." He helped Arthur to some peanuts. "How do you feel?" he asked.
Something in the air
As is well known, Alter Rebbe had three cheiderim: from Aleph to Gimmel. Cheider Aleph was more complicated than Beis, and Beis than Gimmel. Talmidim from a lower cheider were naturally not allowed to sit on the classes of a higher cheider. But the opposite was also true.
One chossid from the cheider Aleph really wanted to hear what Alter Rebbe was teaching in the cheider Gimmel. So, he bribed some of the talmidim there (with promises of Chassidus) to sneak him in. He hid under a table. Then it turned out that Alter Rebbe was being delayed. So, he said: “I am going to sleep here in the corner; when the Rebbe enters the building, wake me up.”
After a while, Alter Rebbe suddenly entered the building, and the talmidim hurriedly woke the chossid up. He didn’t have time to wash nigleh vasser, but since one is not necessarily obligated to do so after having slept during the day, he just went back to his hiding place under the table. Alter Rebbe came in and immediately said: “Oy, there is ruach tumah in here.” The chossid jumped out from under the table and ran out.
One chossid from the cheider Aleph really wanted to hear what Alter Rebbe was teaching in the cheider Gimmel. So, he bribed some of the talmidim there (with promises of Chassidus) to sneak him in. He hid under a table. Then it turned out that Alter Rebbe was being delayed. So, he said: “I am going to sleep here in the corner; when the Rebbe enters the building, wake me up.”
After a while, Alter Rebbe suddenly entered the building, and the talmidim hurriedly woke the chossid up. He didn’t have time to wash nigleh vasser, but since one is not necessarily obligated to do so after having slept during the day, he just went back to his hiding place under the table. Alter Rebbe came in and immediately said: “Oy, there is ruach tumah in here.” The chossid jumped out from under the table and ran out.
* * *
A similar story had happened to Alter Rebbe himself. One year in Mezeritch, he didn’t have a metal cup for the seider. So, he kashered a glass cup by filling it up with water and letting it sit for a day and then repeating it two more times. According to most opinions — but not all — that is ok.
Then, when the seider was about to start, the Maggid was hesitant. He was waiting and waiting, and finally got up and started walking around. He came to Alter Rebbe and asked him about the origins of the cup. Alter Rebbe told him. The Maggid said: “There is a malach standing next to me and not allowing me to start the seider. He says that according to some, there is chometz on my table. Please throw this cup away — I will share my cup with you.”
This part of the story is my favorite: “According to some, there is chometz on my table.”
Monday, April 12, 2010
Where does it say that in Halacha?
For yet another time I am re-posting the quote below.
The context (this time) is a statement on one of the blogs that a solution to the “shidduch crisis” is to pull down mechitza — figuratively and literally, except in the cases explicitly mandated by Halacha (i.e., davening). The author of the opinion says, for example, that mehadrin buses in Eretz Yisroel which separate men and women are counter-productive to healthy opportunities for young singles to meet. To my surprised response: “Do you want the singles to meet on a bus?”, the author responded along the lines of: “What’s the problem?” (Note that I am not endorsing the mehadrin buses themselves or the behavior of chareidim on them. That’s a separate issue.)
To me, the answer (of what the problem is) is rather clear from multiple perspectives. I consulted with my rabbis to make sure I am not nuts, and they confirmed that at least in this issue I seem to be within boundaries of reason. I.e., that it is certainly an authentic value in Judaism that tznius goes beyond a skirt length, and that separation between genders goes beyond davening. There are very clear reasons for this that are, moreover, very rational.
My point right now is not to discuss the issue of tznius and solutions to shidduch crisis. I wanted to express my opinion that stripping Judaism to the bare bones of Halacha is, in and of itself, past nisht. (More on the topic here.) Now the excerpt from the post on Circus Tent:
Update: the point of my quoting the above passage is not to compare the two types of communities, but to compare the two approaches to Torah.
The context (this time) is a statement on one of the blogs that a solution to the “shidduch crisis” is to pull down mechitza — figuratively and literally, except in the cases explicitly mandated by Halacha (i.e., davening). The author of the opinion says, for example, that mehadrin buses in Eretz Yisroel which separate men and women are counter-productive to healthy opportunities for young singles to meet. To my surprised response: “Do you want the singles to meet on a bus?”, the author responded along the lines of: “What’s the problem?” (Note that I am not endorsing the mehadrin buses themselves or the behavior of chareidim on them. That’s a separate issue.)
To me, the answer (of what the problem is) is rather clear from multiple perspectives. I consulted with my rabbis to make sure I am not nuts, and they confirmed that at least in this issue I seem to be within boundaries of reason. I.e., that it is certainly an authentic value in Judaism that tznius goes beyond a skirt length, and that separation between genders goes beyond davening. There are very clear reasons for this that are, moreover, very rational.
My point right now is not to discuss the issue of tznius and solutions to shidduch crisis. I wanted to express my opinion that stripping Judaism to the bare bones of Halacha is, in and of itself, past nisht. (More on the topic here.) Now the excerpt from the post on Circus Tent:
Today in the US we have a whole range of people under 60, American born, whose knowledge of Judaism is based exclusively on books, and those books are the Shulchan Aruch and Gemora. Most of these people had parents who I am sure were fine people but left behind the emotional attachment to echte Yiddishkayt in Europe. Here they belonged to Young Israel synagogues and became very acculturated and lost that special hergesh. In America, Judaism was reduced to learning and doing mitzvos by rote. These people include most MO Jews, the so-called Yeshiva community, and even some “Amerikane Chasidim”.Even though it is not the main topic of my post, my rabbi points out that the so-called “shidduch crisis” seems to be affecting the groups listed in the first, not the second paragraph (the ones whose mechitza is barely there as it is).
On the other side we have people whose view of Judaism was shaped by seeing how their parents acted, felt, laughed, cried, talked and walked. These people tended to have a genuine Mesorah. They saw Judaism as more than just book learning, and the book learning included Midrash, Chassidus, Sifrei Mussar, vechulu. This people tend to be Chassidic and a few Misnagdim who come from European homes. And in the background of all of this loomed the Holocaust, not Coney Island! To the first category Rabbonim are “machinove”, automated people who act in a mathematical way, and have no emotions. The second category knows that Judaism is more than the dry letter of the law.
Update: the point of my quoting the above passage is not to compare the two types of communities, but to compare the two approaches to Torah.
Socialism on the road
_-_Volga_Boatmen_(1870-1873).jpg)
(Ilya Repin, “Volga Boatmen” — click on the image to enlarge)
Reading this passage:
He and three other men, so he said, were sculling a very heavily laden boat up from Maidenhead one evening, and a little above Cookham lock they noticed a fellow and a girl, walking along the towpath, both deep in an apparently interesting and absorbing conversation. They were carrying a boat-hook between them, and, attached to the boat-hook was a tow-line, which trailed behind them, its end in the water. No boat was near, no boat was in sight. There must have been a boat attached to that tow-line at some time or other, that was certain; but what had become of it, what ghastly fate had overtaken it, and those who had been left in it, was buried in mystery. Whatever the accident may have been, however, it had in no way disturbed the young lady and gentleman, who were towing. They had the boat-hook and they had the line, and that seemed to be all that they thought necessary to their work.— has reminded me of this post by arbat:
George was about to call out and wake them up, but, at that moment, a bright idea flashed across him, and he didn't. He got the hitcher instead, and reached over, and drew in the end of the tow-line; and they made a loop in it, and put it over their mast, and then they tidied up the sculls, and went and sat down in the stern, and lit their pipes.
And that young man and young woman towed those four hulking chaps and a heavy boat up to Marlow.
George said he never saw so much thoughtful sadness concentrated into one glance before, as when, at the lock, that young couple grasped the idea that, for the last two miles, they had been towing the wrong boat. George fancied that, if it had not been for the restraining influence of the sweet woman at his side, the young man might have given way to violent language.
The maiden was the first to recover from her surprise, and, when she did, she clasped her hands, and said, wildly:
"Oh, Henry, then WHERE is auntie?"
Another study in the University of Utah: people are sat in front of a wheel and watched how they drive. Then they are given a phone and watched how their driving changes. It turns out that less than 3% drive the car as well with the phone as without.
I am not worried about the study itself, but by the conclusion that the journalists will make out of it. Or, what’s worse, the politicians cheered on by the journalists. You see, the politicians have a Pavlovian reflex in response to any “scientific” study — to ban something. The obviously idiotic reaction to this study is to ban cell phone in the cars. Completely.
Why do I consider this reflex idiotic? Well, since you’re asking — imagine that such a study were conducted not with cell phones but with radio. Or music. Or a conversation on a topic interesting to the driver.
Imagine we start measuring how a young man’s attention is decreased from having a beautiful girl next to him. Or a woman, who has a husband sitting next to her and giving her advice on how to drive. Imagine you have a child in the back who needs to be told a story. Or two kids who are trying to take the Gameboy away from each other. Or a mother-in-law?Now, within the last year, I have rear-ended a car once, driving at a slow speed (no damage done), while stuck in traffic on Belt Parkway and looking for a ma’amor on my mp3 player. Before that, I had almost gotten into an accident several times because of one of the reasons listed above. Also from trying to figure out where exactly my GPS was showing me to go. But never from talking on a cell phone.
What do you think: will these things end up being less distracting than a cell phone or more? What should we do? Ban having passengers in cars? Ban audios and CD players?
What if a problem is not in the cell phone, but in the boredom of drivers that need to find some distraction?
Or, imagine a person who needs to call somewhere. Check that his child did the homework. Or talk to a client. Or call his wife, because he forgot to tell her that tonight his friends are coming over for a game of poker. Not to call in such situations means consequences. What do you think, should we measure how much his driving skills will deteriorate?
Gentlment, we are all sick
The scene is borrowed from Jerome K. Jerome’s Three Men in a Boat:
It is a most extraordinary thing, but I never read a patent medicine advertisement without being impelled to the conclusion that I am suffering from the particular disease therein dealt with in its most virulent form. The diagnosis seems in every case to correspond exactly with all the sensations that I have ever felt.Next time someone asks me what is the matter with me, I think it makes sense to answer the following:
I remember going to the British Museum one day to read up the treatment for some slight ailment of which I had a touch - hay fever, I fancy it was. I got down the book, and read all I came to read; and then, in an unthinking moment, I idly turned the leaves, and began to indolently study diseases, generally. I forget which was the first distemper I plunged into - some fearful, devastating scourge, I know - and, before I had glanced half down the list of "premonitory symptoms," it was borne in upon me that I had fairly got it.
I sat for awhile, frozen with horror; and then, in the listlessness of despair, I again turned over the pages. I came to typhoid fever - read the symptoms - discovered that I had typhoid fever, must have had it for months without knowing it - wondered what else I had got; turned up St. Vitus's Dance - found, as I expected, that I had that too, - began to get interested in my case, and determined to sift it to the bottom, and so started alphabetically - read up ague, and learnt that I was sickening for it, and that the acute stage would commence in about another fortnight. Bright's disease, I was relieved to find, I had only in a modified form, and, so far as that was concerned, I might live for years. Cholera I had, with severe complications; and diphtheria I seemed to have been born with. I plodded conscientiously through the twenty-six letters, and the only malady I could conclude I had not got was housemaid's knee.
I will not take up your time, dear boy, with telling you what is the matter with me. Life is brief, and you might pass away before I had finished. But I will tell you what is not the matter with me. I have not got housemaid's knee. Why I have not got housemaid's knee, I cannot tell you; but the fact remains that I have not got it. Everything else, however, I have got.
Speaking of chumros...
As I was re-reading a novella by one of my favorite writers, this paragraph caught my sight:
What do I like about Sapkowski, you ask? His sense of humor. For instance:
I bowed with my helmet on, and with the gloved fist I touched the coat of mail on my breast. I didn’t introduce myself. I had the right not to. The shield hanging by my side, turned back to front, was a clear sign that I wished to preserve my incognito. The knightly customs had by then assumed the character of commonly accepted norm. I didn’t think it a healthy development, but then the knights’ customs grew odder, not to say idiotic, by the day.I suppose some things never change.
What do I like about Sapkowski, you ask? His sense of humor. For instance:
I bet my head that in Ireland Christianity will be a passing fashion. We Irish, we do not buy this hard, inflexible, Roman fanaticism. We are too sober-headed for that, too simple-hearted. Our Ireland is the fore-post of the West, it’s the Last Shore. Beyond, not far off, are the Old Lands: Hy Brasil, Ys, Mainistir Leitreach, Beag-Arainn. It is they, not the Cross, not the Latin liturgy, that rule people’s minds. It was so ages ago and it’s so today. Besides, we Irish are a tolerant people. Everybody believes what he wants. I heard that around the world different factions of Christians are already at each other’s throats. In Ireland it’s impossible. I can imagine everything, but not that Ulster, say, might be a scene of religious scuffles.
Sunday, April 11, 2010
Rossini and sphiras ha’oimer
The best of all are those people that refuse to shave all 49 days of the Omer to be acording to the shita of the Arizal and Kabballah, and then they shave Erev Shavuos with a “leshem yichud” beforehand.
For those of you whose spirits have been sombered up by the seriousness of the previous post, a little sphera-friendly entertainment:
On a related topic, does chochmas chitzoinius even refer to science, or merely to stuff like this?
You are wrong!
[I am re-posting this.]
(I was thinking of finding a picture appropriate to the topic of machloikes, but then thought that nothing would fit better than this video, which I like very much.)
I’d like to thank Dixie Yid for a link to “the comment thread at A Simple Jew’s Post, The Essence of Emunah [of] an interesting back-and-forth discussion between R’ Micha Berger & R’ Micha Golshevsky regarding the inner unity behind the major machlokes’n in history”.
As I was reading the discussion, I thought this (not necessarily regarding any side of the discussion):
It seems to me that sometimes our American sensitivity and tendency to make peace and accommodate everyone’s opinion (commendable though this tendency may be) gets in a way of understanding the machloikes. Back in the day, people didn’t have a problem saying “I disagree.” Not “I am right on some level, you are right on another level”, but “I am right, and you are wrong.” Doesn’t mean they didn’t respect the other side’s opinion (depending on the nature of machloikes, of course), but they still thought it to be wrong.
[Beginning of a long digression — feel free to skip to the next asterisks]
There is a second level of justification — from spiritual perspective. Obviously, in Judaism we have the statement that “eilu v’eilu dvorim Elokim chayim” (“these and these are words of the living G-d” — regarding the dispute between Shammai and Hillel, but more abstractly regarding most other disputes). What is sometimes overlooked, as my rabbi once told me, is that Shammai and Hillel themselves still believed the other party to be wrong. More importantly (for us), we follow only one of their specific opinions for Halacha purposes. And in many cases when we say that a certain halachic opinion is for this community, while other opinion is for another, it’s only due to the circumstances of us being in golus, as Rambam explains in the introduction to Mishnei Torah.
On the other hand, in many cases, of course, this is not true. We accommodate for multiple opinions in our psak din, and indeed, this is the beauty of Torah both from spiritual/metaphysical and sociological point of view (I can hear teeth grinding). From the latter perspective, says Reb Shlomo Yaffe, accommodation of multiple opinions in the final ruling (since all of them are right, despite sometimes obvious disagreement and even mutual exclusivity), the “bottom line” of Jewish law tends towards the middle. On the other hand, in case of, lehavdil, X-ity and Islam, with passage of time these religions acted like a centrifuge, pushing their choices of the ultimate interpretation of their texts towards the outside, the extreme.
Of course, we, as religious Jews, don’t care so much about sociology (this was just an interesting point explaining the difference between Abrahamic religions — the principle of “eilu v’eilu” vs. “my way or the highway”). From philosophical point of view, the principle of “eilu v’eilu” becomes interesting, because it reveals fully the unlimited and undefined nature of G-dliness, from which Torah stems.
I had a conversation once with an apikoires, who asked me if G-d can create a square circle (a more intelligent way to put the question with the stone). I told him that according to the school of chakirah, He cannot — but it’s a limitation not on G-d, but on our reality, or, as Rabbi Gottlieb put it, one our language (i.e., our logic). “When you say square circle, I hear words, but no meaning enters my mind. So, you’re asking me, can G-d create _____, and there is nothing in the blank. You did not ask any question.” Or, to put it differently, G-d could create a square circle, but it would be incompatible with our reality (it’s a slightly different statement from Rabbi Gottlieb’s, but I’ll just lump them in one category for now).
On the other hand, I said, the school of mysticism teaches that G-d indeed can create a square circle and even make it compatible with our reality. In fact, in our history, such things have happened (if you are lazy to read the whole post, in the case of Menoira oil both burning and not burning at the same time, or in the case of Aron Koidesh not taking any space). Now, how the square circle would look to us is a different story. Perhaps it would look like a hologram or, more simply, like a Necker cube, only not on the level of illusion or perceptual ambiguity, but in reality.
“This is interesting,” the apikoires said. “But this means that G-d could tell you to do X and not to do X at the same time. What would you do then?” He thought he had me, but he made a trap for himself. In fact, I explained, every law that G-d gave us is like this. Torah derives from G-dliness, which is multidimensional (infinitely-dimensional, even, one might say). It is the job of our authorities, then, to bring down a specific dimension of each law to this world — and this is where the disagreement stems from, when one authority’s spiritual level is different from that of the other, and as a result, they disagree on the practical “interpretation” of the law, since the particular dimension of the law that one brings down is different from that of another authority.
In practice, sometimes we rule in favor of one opinion, and sometimes the other (because only one opinion may be appropriate for this world, for this particular place and this particular time), but sometimes we accommodate for multiple opinions. An example I gave is that of dipping chalah in soup on Shabbos. On Shabbos, a Jew is not allowed to cook. Skipping many details, this means he is not allowed to put something defined legally as uncooked into a hot soup still in the first or second vessel of cooking. What about challah? Is baking the same as cooking? If it is, then he is allowed to dip challah in that soup (since something already cooked cannot be further cooked). If it’s not, then he is not allowed to dip challah in the soup (since that would be tantamount to cooking the challah). There is a disagreement in opinions.
We rule that lehatchilo one should not dip challah in the soup, but b’diyavad, if someone already dipped the challah (e.g., having not paid attention), one is allowed to eat it. Thus, in our ruling we accommodate for both opinions, despite the fact that they are opposite and mutually exclusive.
Furthermore, from mystical perspective, we learn that even those opinions that were presented in Gemara and were clearly rejected as unsupported by our tradition, are still true on some spiritual level. In fact, they are even higher (from the point of view of gilui) than the opinions that were accepted — and this is why they were rejected, being incompatible with this lowly world (of course, b’etzem, the accepted opinions are higher, since they allow for dira b’tachtoinim). See this beautiful chapter (“Co-existence of Contradictory Truths”) from the Gutnick edition of Rambam’s 9th and 10th principles (with commentaries ranging from classical to those of the Lubavitcher Rebbe) for further discussion on the topic of the spiritual origin of different opinions and the reasons for their inclusion in Gemara (even those that were rejected).
[End of the long digression]
(I was thinking of finding a picture appropriate to the topic of machloikes, but then thought that nothing would fit better than this video, which I like very much.)
I’d like to thank Dixie Yid for a link to “the comment thread at A Simple Jew’s Post, The Essence of Emunah [of] an interesting back-and-forth discussion between R’ Micha Berger & R’ Micha Golshevsky regarding the inner unity behind the major machlokes’n in history”.
As I was reading the discussion, I thought this (not necessarily regarding any side of the discussion):
It seems to me that sometimes our American sensitivity and tendency to make peace and accommodate everyone’s opinion (commendable though this tendency may be) gets in a way of understanding the machloikes. Back in the day, people didn’t have a problem saying “I disagree.” Not “I am right on some level, you are right on another level”, but “I am right, and you are wrong.” Doesn’t mean they didn’t respect the other side’s opinion (depending on the nature of machloikes, of course), but they still thought it to be wrong.
* * *
[Beginning of a long digression — feel free to skip to the next asterisks]
There is a second level of justification — from spiritual perspective. Obviously, in Judaism we have the statement that “eilu v’eilu dvorim Elokim chayim” (“these and these are words of the living G-d” — regarding the dispute between Shammai and Hillel, but more abstractly regarding most other disputes). What is sometimes overlooked, as my rabbi once told me, is that Shammai and Hillel themselves still believed the other party to be wrong. More importantly (for us), we follow only one of their specific opinions for Halacha purposes. And in many cases when we say that a certain halachic opinion is for this community, while other opinion is for another, it’s only due to the circumstances of us being in golus, as Rambam explains in the introduction to Mishnei Torah.
On the other hand, in many cases, of course, this is not true. We accommodate for multiple opinions in our psak din, and indeed, this is the beauty of Torah both from spiritual/metaphysical and sociological point of view (I can hear teeth grinding). From the latter perspective, says Reb Shlomo Yaffe, accommodation of multiple opinions in the final ruling (since all of them are right, despite sometimes obvious disagreement and even mutual exclusivity), the “bottom line” of Jewish law tends towards the middle. On the other hand, in case of, lehavdil, X-ity and Islam, with passage of time these religions acted like a centrifuge, pushing their choices of the ultimate interpretation of their texts towards the outside, the extreme.
Of course, we, as religious Jews, don’t care so much about sociology (this was just an interesting point explaining the difference between Abrahamic religions — the principle of “eilu v’eilu” vs. “my way or the highway”). From philosophical point of view, the principle of “eilu v’eilu” becomes interesting, because it reveals fully the unlimited and undefined nature of G-dliness, from which Torah stems.
I had a conversation once with an apikoires, who asked me if G-d can create a square circle (a more intelligent way to put the question with the stone). I told him that according to the school of chakirah, He cannot — but it’s a limitation not on G-d, but on our reality, or, as Rabbi Gottlieb put it, one our language (i.e., our logic). “When you say square circle, I hear words, but no meaning enters my mind. So, you’re asking me, can G-d create _____, and there is nothing in the blank. You did not ask any question.” Or, to put it differently, G-d could create a square circle, but it would be incompatible with our reality (it’s a slightly different statement from Rabbi Gottlieb’s, but I’ll just lump them in one category for now).
On the other hand, I said, the school of mysticism teaches that G-d indeed can create a square circle and even make it compatible with our reality. In fact, in our history, such things have happened (if you are lazy to read the whole post, in the case of Menoira oil both burning and not burning at the same time, or in the case of Aron Koidesh not taking any space). Now, how the square circle would look to us is a different story. Perhaps it would look like a hologram or, more simply, like a Necker cube, only not on the level of illusion or perceptual ambiguity, but in reality.
“This is interesting,” the apikoires said. “But this means that G-d could tell you to do X and not to do X at the same time. What would you do then?” He thought he had me, but he made a trap for himself. In fact, I explained, every law that G-d gave us is like this. Torah derives from G-dliness, which is multidimensional (infinitely-dimensional, even, one might say). It is the job of our authorities, then, to bring down a specific dimension of each law to this world — and this is where the disagreement stems from, when one authority’s spiritual level is different from that of the other, and as a result, they disagree on the practical “interpretation” of the law, since the particular dimension of the law that one brings down is different from that of another authority.
In practice, sometimes we rule in favor of one opinion, and sometimes the other (because only one opinion may be appropriate for this world, for this particular place and this particular time), but sometimes we accommodate for multiple opinions. An example I gave is that of dipping chalah in soup on Shabbos. On Shabbos, a Jew is not allowed to cook. Skipping many details, this means he is not allowed to put something defined legally as uncooked into a hot soup still in the first or second vessel of cooking. What about challah? Is baking the same as cooking? If it is, then he is allowed to dip challah in that soup (since something already cooked cannot be further cooked). If it’s not, then he is not allowed to dip challah in the soup (since that would be tantamount to cooking the challah). There is a disagreement in opinions.
We rule that lehatchilo one should not dip challah in the soup, but b’diyavad, if someone already dipped the challah (e.g., having not paid attention), one is allowed to eat it. Thus, in our ruling we accommodate for both opinions, despite the fact that they are opposite and mutually exclusive.
Furthermore, from mystical perspective, we learn that even those opinions that were presented in Gemara and were clearly rejected as unsupported by our tradition, are still true on some spiritual level. In fact, they are even higher (from the point of view of gilui) than the opinions that were accepted — and this is why they were rejected, being incompatible with this lowly world (of course, b’etzem, the accepted opinions are higher, since they allow for dira b’tachtoinim). See this beautiful chapter (“Co-existence of Contradictory Truths”) from the Gutnick edition of Rambam’s 9th and 10th principles (with commentaries ranging from classical to those of the Lubavitcher Rebbe) for further discussion on the topic of the spiritual origin of different opinions and the reasons for their inclusion in Gemara (even those that were rejected).
[End of the long digression]
* * *
I think despite all of the above, however, we still overlook the other, non-accomodating side of the machloikes. Yes, sometimes we rule in favor of both parties. And sometimes we say that this is right for us, and this is right for them. But sometimes we rule in favor of only one opinion! Sometimes we say that only one opinion is more appropriate for everyone.
Or, more specifically, sometimes we follow a particular shitta, and even though we recognize the other shitta as beautiful, and part of Torah, and “words of the living G-d”, and shining brightly on some high spiritual level — but here, in this world, where we are trying to bring Mashiach, this shitta is less appropriate than the one we accept. Of course, people who hold according to that shitta may think the same about ours. And we think they are wrong in practice (or at least less right than we are), and they think we are wrong. And guess what? There is nothing wrong with thinking someone is wrong. There is not always a need to sweeten the pill.
Or, more specifically, sometimes we follow a particular shitta, and even though we recognize the other shitta as beautiful, and part of Torah, and “words of the living G-d”, and shining brightly on some high spiritual level — but here, in this world, where we are trying to bring Mashiach, this shitta is less appropriate than the one we accept. Of course, people who hold according to that shitta may think the same about ours. And we think they are wrong in practice (or at least less right than we are), and they think we are wrong. And guess what? There is nothing wrong with thinking someone is wrong. There is not always a need to sweeten the pill.
The leader of the generation is the entire generation
As an aside, it saddens me that most of my readers are not true believers. Out of 17 answers to my question (“Can G-d learn something new?”) only 4 gave the correct answer (“Yes!”). That’s less than 25%.
Please answer the new poll. Let’s see how many people pick the right answer now.
Friday, April 9, 2010
Gedeilim and Rebbeim
Quoth TRS:
I disagree completely. As this video will show, there is no semblance whatsoever between the representatives of two worlds:
I hope each of you saw it clearly. I am only sorry the video stopped, and we were not zoiche to hearing the continuation of this brilliant conversation.
In my opinion, the worlds of Lithuanian and Chagas Jewry have moved closer and closer together to the point where the only thing separating them is their clothes and their accents. And even then, not so much. Witness the increased veneration for the Godol's every breath, and the decreasing enrollment at chassidish Yeshivas, with the corresponding increase in Litvisher places of learning.
I disagree completely. As this video will show, there is no semblance whatsoever between the representatives of two worlds:
I hope each of you saw it clearly. I am only sorry the video stopped, and we were not zoiche to hearing the continuation of this brilliant conversation.
Have you seen that hoopoe?
A slightly more civil scene for those of my readers who have no interest in surgeries or duels.
The scene of the second meeting between Jack Aubrey and Stephen Maturin in Patrick O’Brian’s Master and Commander:
The scene of the second meeting between Jack Aubrey and Stephen Maturin in Patrick O’Brian’s Master and Commander:
Subclavian, or aorta itself
In the post in which I quoted a passage about Patrick O’Brian’s Stephen Maturin performing a surgery on himself, a couple things should have caught your attention: 1) Dr. Maturin inquired whether the woman whom he asked Jack Aubrey to visit was wearing black, and 2) when he declined the offer of another doctor, he said: “No, sir. I do this with my own hand. If it could undertake the one task, it must undertake the other: that is but justice.”
Putting the two things together, one realizes where Maturin got his wound — at a duel over a woman! (And he was wondering whether she was mourning over the other fellow by wearing black — which she wasn’t.) As any red-blooded male, I like to read about duels (although I prefer swords to pistols), so here it is:
Putting the two things together, one realizes where Maturin got his wound — at a duel over a woman! (And he was wondering whether she was mourning over the other fellow by wearing black — which she wasn’t.) As any red-blooded male, I like to read about duels (although I prefer swords to pistols), so here it is:
Shabos mevorchim Iyar
This Shabbos we bless the upcoming month of Iyar. The Rebbe says in one of the sichos that Iyar is holier than Nissan. Don’t forget to read the seifer Tehillim before davening on Shabbos. (This means getting up extra early. And for those of us not fortunate to be davening in nusach Arizal minyonim on Shabbos — extra-extra early.)
Thursday, April 8, 2010
Never you fret, sir
Recently I posted an account of a Russian doctor performing a self-surgery (an appendectomy).
A scene from H.M.S. Surprise, where Dr. Stephen Maturin operates on himself, removing a bullet from his own body:
A scene from H.M.S. Surprise, where Dr. Stephen Maturin operates on himself, removing a bullet from his own body:
The world is watching
Very good post about chillul Hashem. I wish I was as holy as the Rebbe’s melamed in cheider to walk our whenever something bad was spoken about other Jews. But I’ve seen the effects of chillul Hashem firsthand — it affected me, my friends (and former friends), and my family.
I have already expressed my frustration on the subject. Long gone are the times when Frierdiker Rebbe wrote in a letter that for a talmid chochom it is inappropriate to walk on the street, eating sunflower seeds. Today everyone dresses in a suit and wears a hat, since — hey, we are Jews! We are not supposed to dress casually, like goyim. And yet we find, strangely enough, that the people who dress in jeans and are lenient on half their mitzvos behave like mentchen, while those that are not eating strawberries for kashrus concerns and make sure their cereal is pas Yisroel behave like beheimas.
Be machmir on gebrochts in you behavior first. You are here to make the world G-dly.
(And, as anyone reading my blog can see, I am all for chumras and hiddurim. One of the comments on that post said something like: “Ironically, one of these people would look at MO woman in pants and think: ‘What a shame!’” Well, it is ironic. He should be looking at himself first. But the fact that this woman is wearing pants is a shame.)
I have already expressed my frustration on the subject. Long gone are the times when Frierdiker Rebbe wrote in a letter that for a talmid chochom it is inappropriate to walk on the street, eating sunflower seeds. Today everyone dresses in a suit and wears a hat, since — hey, we are Jews! We are not supposed to dress casually, like goyim. And yet we find, strangely enough, that the people who dress in jeans and are lenient on half their mitzvos behave like mentchen, while those that are not eating strawberries for kashrus concerns and make sure their cereal is pas Yisroel behave like beheimas.
Be machmir on gebrochts in you behavior first. You are here to make the world G-dly.
(And, as anyone reading my blog can see, I am all for chumras and hiddurim. One of the comments on that post said something like: “Ironically, one of these people would look at MO woman in pants and think: ‘What a shame!’” Well, it is ironic. He should be looking at himself first. But the fact that this woman is wearing pants is a shame.)
(Mattir ossurim)⁻¹
(source)
An interesting story (source):
Reb Aaron Yaffe, the shochet, related the following story:Another interesting thing I heard recently: in Chabad, we don’t say a brocho on tefillin shel roish, because (al pi inyonim pnimi’im*) it is too holy. Saying a brocho means that we are drawing down into this world the G-dly Light necessary for the union of G-d and the physical matter with which a mitzva is performed. But if the Light is too high for us to draw down into this world, saying a brocho would be in vain.
When I was younger I worked as a melamed in a small village, and as shochet for the neighboring towns. When we heard that the Tzemach Tzedek would not only be passing through our village, but would also be staying for several days, we hurried to make the proper preparations for his visit. When the Rebbe arrived, I was supposed to slaughter a chicken for his meal. Before I did so, however, I went to show him my chalef (shechita knife) before proceeding. The Rebbe approved, and indeed ate the meat I provided during his entire stay in our town. The Tzemach Tzedek received all who wished to speak to him in private, and in the course of events, it became my turn for yechidus.
"What is your request?" the Rebbe asked when I entered his room.
"I have a halachik question that troubles me," I began. "I am disturbed by all the restrictions instituted relatively late in our history, on things that previous generations of rabbis considered permissible. Does this mean, G-d forbid, that earlier generations of Jews were eating food that was not kosher? How is this possible?" I said.
"Do you understand what the words assur and muttar mean?" asked the Tzemach Tzedek. "Assur literally means 'bound up,' 'restrained' by the klipos, or husks of the sitra achra, the forces of evil. As is explained in the Tanya, these things cannot be elevated and transformed into holiness, even if they are eaten with the proper thoughts and intentions. Muttar, on the other hand, literally means 'untied' or 'loose,' indicating those things that it is possible to elevate and refine if we eat them with the proper intentions and for the sake of heaven.
"During earlier generations, when souls came from a much higher source, our forefathers had the spiritual strength and power to elevate many things that were originally considered permissible. With the passage of time and the diminution of our spirituality, our Rabbis have forbidden many things that were previously allowed. Our souls are inferior to those that were sent down before us, and it is just not in our power to turn these things into holiness."
That is also one of the the reasons why during the seider we say “Boruch ha’makom” without the Eibeshter’s name.
Relevant posts:
Elevating reishus___________
They will not see me
Spiritual timelessness of Judaism
Demanding a timeless answer
* Not to be confused with the halachic reason.
Wednesday, April 7, 2010
Evolution of liberal reform (part 2)
(Part 1 here.)
A friend of mine on the Facebook says: “My employer put in new carpets and installed auto flush toilets in the bathrooms. We still have free soda. Does this mean that recession is over?”
His friend responds: “No... Actually, it means that the recession is worse. Notice that the automated toilets flush directly into the input-pipe of the free soda machine.”
That, my friends, is what most liberal reforms are all about.
A friend of mine on the Facebook says: “My employer put in new carpets and installed auto flush toilets in the bathrooms. We still have free soda. Does this mean that recession is over?”
His friend responds: “No... Actually, it means that the recession is worse. Notice that the automated toilets flush directly into the input-pipe of the free soda machine.”
That, my friends, is what most liberal reforms are all about.
Tuesday, April 6, 2010
A Jew for G-d
We find in Torah that the first one to call Jews a nation was the Pharaoh: “Behold, the people of the children of Israel are more numerous and stronger than we are” (Shmois 1:9). G-d is the second to call Jews a nation, while talking to Moshe Rabbeinu, and later, in the context of giving Jews Torah.
Sunday, April 4, 2010
Be who you are
I’ve heard this story on the second day of Yom Tov (Wed.) from one of the rabbis in Brooklyn:
Every year, chassidim would wish the Rebbe that “the Rebbe should be alive next year”. To which he would respond: “gam atoh” (“you too”). One year, a chossid came to the Rebbe and wished/asked him that “the Rebbe should reveal himself”. Meaning, of course, that the Rebbe should reveal himself as [who he is]. To which the Rebbe responded: “gam atoh”.Those of understanding will understand.
This can be explained as follows. Every person has the deepest potential of who he is in the essence. The chossid wished the Rebbe that he reveals this deepest potential and his true and deepest role. While the Rebbe, in his turn, wished the chossid that he does the same, regarding himself.
So, what is the deepest essence of every Jew? In Tanya we learn that every Jew is “cheilek elokah mi’ma’al mamosh” — a part of G-dliness Above literally.
Some facts on the healthcare bill
Go, Wisconsin.
Another one, more accessible to the average IQ, and going to the core of the problem with liberalism:
Now, one mistake in the above videos is the assumptions that liberals 1) care about numbers, 2) know what the numbers mean, 3) have any semblance of distinguishing the reality from a fantasy.
The full speech from the second video (emphasis mine):
Another one, more accessible to the average IQ, and going to the core of the problem with liberalism:
Now, one mistake in the above videos is the assumptions that liberals 1) care about numbers, 2) know what the numbers mean, 3) have any semblance of distinguishing the reality from a fantasy.
The full speech from the second video (emphasis mine):
RepPaulRyan — March 21, 2010 — Madam speaker, there is a lot wrong with this bill.
We know the problems with its cost. We know it doesnt really reduce the deficit. We know that it increases health care premiums. The CBO has given us all of this information and its clear that what we have is a bill chock full of gimmicks and hidden mandates.
So I’m not going to get into all of that again.
But what I will ask is this: why has this decision become so personal to our constituents? Why are so many people swarming the Capitol over this? Why have we received 100,000 calls an hour from all over the country?
It is because health care affects every one of us. And yet, here we are, debating whether the government should have a bigger role in making those personal decisions.
So make no mistake about it. Were not just here to pass a healthcare bill. We are being asked to make a choice about the future path of this country.
The speakers to my left are correct: this is history. Today marks a major turning point in American history. This is really not a debate about prices, coverage, or choosing doctors.
This is ultimately about what kind of country we are going to be in the 21st century.
America is not just a nationality its not just a mass of land from Hawaii to Maine, from Wisconsin to Florida. America is an idea. Its the most pro-human idea ever designed by mankind.
Our founders got it right, when they wrote in the Declaration of Independence that our rights come from nature and nature's God — not from government.
Should we now subscribe to an ideology where government creates rights, is solely responsible for delivering these artificial rights, and then systematically rations these rights?
Do we believe that the goal of government is to promote equal opportunity for all Americans to make the most of their lives — or do we now believe that government’s role is to equalize the results of peoples lives?
The philosophy advanced on the floor by the Majority today is so paternalistic, and so arrogant. It’s condescending. And it tramples upon the principles that have made America so exceptional.
My friends, we are fast approaching a tipping point where more Americans depend on the federal government than on themselves for their livelihoods — a point where we, the American people, trade in our commitment and our concern for our individual liberties in exchange for government benefits and dependencies.
More to the point, Madam Speaker, we have seen this movie before, and we know how it ends. The European social welfare state promoted by this legislation is not sustainable.
This is not who we are and it is not who we should become.
As we march toward this tipping point of dependency, we are also accelerating toward a debt crisis a debt crisis that is the result of politicians of the past making promises we simply cannot afford to keep. Déjà vu all over again.
It is unconscionable what we are leaving the next generation.
This moment may mark a temporary conclusion of the health care debate — but its place in history has not yet been decided. If this passes, the quest to reclaim the American idea is not over. The fight to reapply our founding principles is not finished, it’s just a steeper climb. And it is a climb that we will make.
On this issue — more than any other issue we have ever seen here — the American people are engaged. From our town hall meetings, to Scott Brown’s victory in Massachusetts, you have made your voices heard. And some of us are listening to you.
My colleagues, lets bring down this bill — and bring back the ideas that made this country great!
Saturday, April 3, 2010
Про Перельмана и миллион

(Grigoriy Perel’man, known amongst the mathematicians as “The Dude”)
Стихи. По-моему гениально. И грустно.
[For those who don’t speak Russian: background azoy.]
Friday, April 2, 2010
The hat
From here:
(This reminds me of a story about the Kotzker Rebbe, iirc. He always knew what his chassidim’s thoughts were, and if someone at his tish had bad thoughts, the Rebbe would scream at him. So, one time a chossid had a bad thought in the presence of the Kotzker Rebbe and immediately regretted it, anticipating being screamed at. But then he thought: “Hashem surely knows my thoughts too. And yet He seems not to mind. Why then does the Rebbe mind?” The Kotzker Rebbe answered: “Hashem can take it. I can’t.”)
This does not just apply to the hat, by the way (and also with the hat, it’s not about the “shtick”, but about what stands behind the hat). And not just to davening. Hashem is rachamim, merciful. He will tolerate all kinds of behavior. But each one of us should be disgusted with himself for taking advantage of that.
In the last years, when the health of the Rebbe [Rayatz] was far from perfect, a certain public functionary once arrived in the middle of the week, not at the regular time for yechidus, in order to speak with the Rebbe. When I entered the Rebbe [Rayatz]'s study in order to inform him of his arrival, the Rebbe stretched out his hand to put on his hat, an effort which cost him considerable exertion. I assured the Rebbe that it would not matter to that functionary if he would receive him with only a yarmulke on his head.I think there are multiple ways of understanding this story and multiple lessons that can be drawn from it. One of which is: Hashem may be ok with you saying a brocho or davening to Him without a second head covering (He will still accept you prayers). But you shouldn’t be.
“But to me it does matter,” replied the Rebbe.
(This reminds me of a story about the Kotzker Rebbe, iirc. He always knew what his chassidim’s thoughts were, and if someone at his tish had bad thoughts, the Rebbe would scream at him. So, one time a chossid had a bad thought in the presence of the Kotzker Rebbe and immediately regretted it, anticipating being screamed at. But then he thought: “Hashem surely knows my thoughts too. And yet He seems not to mind. Why then does the Rebbe mind?” The Kotzker Rebbe answered: “Hashem can take it. I can’t.”)
This does not just apply to the hat, by the way (and also with the hat, it’s not about the “shtick”, but about what stands behind the hat). And not just to davening. Hashem is rachamim, merciful. He will tolerate all kinds of behavior. But each one of us should be disgusted with himself for taking advantage of that.
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