Meta-meta-ethics

(NOTE: for those who don't wish to read my summary of moral intuitionism, skip till after the second set of asterisks.)

I wish to propose a meta-meta-ethical view that will give reason for existence of meta-ethical theories.

What does that mean? Well, ethics asks evaluative questions. Such as: "What actions or circumstances are good or bad?" and "What actions or circumstances are right or wrong?"

Meta-ethics asks questions about the nature of evaluative truths. What is good and bad? What is their nature? What do we mean when we say those words (or should mean if we are to make any sense)? How do we know what actions are good or bad? How can we find out?

A meta-meta-ethical analysis asks what the role of making meta-ethical theories is. And how we know that those are true.

One simple answer is: by using reason. We can just see if a meta-ethical theory makes any sense internally. (Just like we would with, say, a geometric theorem.)

For instance, Kant says that a categorical imperative is a kind of imperative that would be binding on you if you knew it to be binding on everyone. Which you can verify by imagining a world in which such an imperative is not binding on anyone. Is this view coherent? Does it make sense? One can ask questions like: Well, yes, it makes sense that were absolute binding rules to exist, they would take form of categorical imperatives. But who says they exist? Also: how are we to judge whether a world in which everyone is free to lie or murder is a good world? Should we use our emotions? Why is that a good method for evaluating whether a world is good or bad?

In other words, we can test the internal coherence of a specific meta-ethical theory.

But people oftentimes don't do just that. They do that and they also test the conclusions of the theory. For instance: is torturing puppies for fun moral? Some might argue that it passes every one of Kant's moral maxims. Is lying to a Nazi asking you where the Jews are hiding immoral? Some argue that according to Kant's maxims it is immoral, and one shouldn't lie even in such a situation.

When people hear such conclusions, they infer that there is something wrong with Kant's meta-ethical theory. Or at least that it is incomplete. Because it leads to absurd conclusions.

But why should that be a test of a meta-ethical theory?

* * *

It seems that people already know what the correct moral answers are — at least in some cases. Even without having a coherent meta-ethical theory on their hands. How do they know? And if they do, what's the use of having meta-ethical theories?

Well, this is where the theory of moral intuitionism comes in. I've discussed it before, and I was introduced to it through writings of a moral philosopher Michael Huemer (whose book, Moral Intuitionism, I am currently reading and recommend to everyone interested in the subject), but, briefly, the idea is that there are moral truths about the world and our actions which we perceive intuitively.

What are these truths metaphysically? I haven't read that far in Huemer's book yet, but from his essays, it seems that he believes that the answer doesn't make sense. It assumes that moral truths must be defined in terms of some other set of truths, like natural truths. But, first, this would defy Humean is–ought gap, and, second, there is no reason why we cannot think of moral truths to be a separate set of truths, besides the natural ones.*

(I expressed my frustration and skepticism with this analysis before and offered an alternative explanation as to the metaphysics of moral truths. But I will leave that issue alone for now. And I am not completely sure I was right.)

How do we know about moral truths? Well, we perceive them. Intuitively. We have a perceptual modality called moral intuition, and through it we perceive certain actions as "choice-worthy" or not. And the idea called phenomenal conservatism says that unless we have a good reason to do otherwise, we should take our perceptions seriously. Because: well, they are there. We know about them. That is some sort of knowledge. Unless you have another sort of knowledge (usually from other perceptions) that denies this knowledge, it seems unreasonable not take the latter seriously.

* * *

So, how can moral intuitionism be a meta-meta-ethical theory? Doesn't it sound like a meta-ethical theory in itself?

Well, to answer this question, we have to humble ourselves a little regarding our physical and mathematical theories. We perceive physical and mathematical "truths" to be exactly such: true (we hope). Of course, with physics, we often re-evaluate our models later. And then again. With math we don't re-evaluate them, but we just make new ones if we need to. (So, in physics, "F=ma" is corrected by Einstein. In Math, Eucledean geometry exists in parallel with Riemannian geometry.)

But perhaps another equally correct way of thinking about both physical and mathematical models is not in terms of their absolute truth (or a degree of approximation thereof), but in terms of their usefulness. It is useful to imagine the world being countable in discrete numbers. It is useful to imagine shapes of all objects as being drawn on a sheet of paper. It is useful to think of the world as full of moving particles.

Until it's not useful anymore. And then, on that level, we apply a different model. What do I mean by "useful"? Useful in what sense? Only in the sense of explanatory power. I can explain how heat flows from one room to another if I model it in terms of many particles' kinetic energy. Such a model is more useful than one having some mysterious substance phlogiston flowing from one place to another, because the first model fits and predicts more observable phenomena.

The same goes for physical concepts like field, mass, energy, force, spin, voltage, and so on. They are just lego pieces that we invented; a perceptual glue to hold our observations together and make them fit into one shape. It's not really clear to me, for example, whether field really exists out there, as a property of space, or whether it's just something we made up to explain charged particles' behavior when they are a certain distance from other charged particles.

Why do we need the models? Because we can't observe all aspects of nature directly. So, we must deduce existence of something from those observations that we can make directly. And those deductions must be judged in terms of their usefulness in terms of their predictive and explanatory power.


What does this have to do with ethics? Well: I know it's wrong to kill humans out of pure convenience (or to prevent inconvenience). I know it's wrong to kill newborn babies. I know it's not wrong to kill one's cancer tumor (lo aleinu) or remove a mole. All these things I know from intuition.

I don't know whether it's wrong to kill fetuses. That's a gray area for my intuition.

For that reason, I need to construct a meta-ethical theory that will somehow incorporate my intuitive knowledge about ethics of "everyday" killing and will give me an answer about the morality of abortion. The data for this theory (that will either verify or break it) will be the moral facts I already know intuitively.

For instance, if we say that it's wrong to kill someone because you're extinguishing consciousness, then it seems OK to kill a fetus before his nervous system is developed enough to be conscious. Well... is it moral to put someone under anesthesia? Is it moral to kill someone, once he is under anesthesia? The answers to these questions seem intuitively obvious, and these answers break the "extinguishing consciousness" theory.

Note that "extinguishing consciousness" theory is not itself internally complete. It doesn't explain why extinguishing consciousness would be wrong. It only attempts to systematize our existing beliefs in some cohesive whole and make predictions about moral truths not immediately accessible to our intuition. Unfortunately, as I said, it is not a good meta-ethical theory, because it is broken by the data: our intuitive knowledge.

This way, moral intuitionism serves not only as a meta-ethical theory (it explains about the nature of moral truths and how we are to know them), but also as a meta-meta-ethical theory: it explains how meta-ethical theories can be useful even if we are not to think of them as "real truths" as opposed to mere models.

_____________
* Also, as an aside, if someone asks you: "What is water?", the most straightforward answer is: "What I perceive to be water: a clear, odorless, tasteless, drinkable liquid, with certain observable physical and chemical properties". Based on those characteristics, I know I am dealing with water.

If you answer: "Well, water is H2O", that invites the question: "What is hydrogen? What is oxygen? What are atoms?" You can explain in terms of electrons and protons, and so on... but eventually you will have to stop. You will have to say that there is a set of phenomena in the universe that behave a certain way, but why they behave that way we don't know for sure yet.

So, does this mean that you fundamentally don't know what water is? That seems strange. Also, imagine that — as unlikely as it sounds — it was proven that actually water is not H2O and H2O is not water. What would that mean? Would we continue calling the H2O water? Seemingly not. We would continue calling water the phenomenon of clear, odorless, tasteless, drinkable liquid that freezes at 0 degrees Celcius.

Basically, this analysis shows us that our perceptions are not chopped liver. Now apply the same analysis to "what is good" and "what is evil", and the answer "that which I perceive as something that ought not be done in principle" doesn't seem so silly anymore.

Chances are: the world was just created

Here is a proof that the world is constantly being created ex nihilo.


A: Science tells us that the states of the Universe progress from less to more entropy (more to less order).

B: This is because a state which is more entropic (less orderly) is more likely to occur than the state that is less entropic (more orderly). Which is because there are more possible former kind of states than the latter.

This is why it is less likely for the smoke to go back into a cigarette than come out of it. Which is why the flow of time has a directionality: things progress from more to less ordered and don't go back, because it's more likely for them to go forward. The Universe has more states to choose from in the "future" pile than in the "past" pile, which is why it tends to pick the "future" ones.


Now, imagine two hypotheses:

1) The world came into being (as it is, with everything in it, including our memories, etc.) 5 minutes ago
2) The world came into being 10 minutes ago

The world in 1) is less orderly than the world in 2), as per A. But that means that that the world in 1) is also the one more likely (as per B)! Hence, it's more likely that hypothesis 1) is more correct.

Which means that it is more likely that the world came into being 5 minutes ago than 100 billion years ago. And so on...

But that also means that it's more likely that the world was just created — a Planck unit of time ago — than any time before it. Ex nihilo.

Any questions?..

Morality and neuro-porn

(parallel circuits of prefrontal cortex and basal ganglia)

I am reading a neuro-porn article about morality. Neuro-porn is a sub-genre of popular science in which writers use imagery or description of brain scans to strengthen a point. In this article, the author is saying that moral judgments are an illusion because certain brain areas light up when a person is making a moral choice. In particular, many of the areas responsible for sub-conscious processing of emotions.

Well, brain areas light up when I am trying to catch a ball or learn how to shoot an arrow from a bow. Does this mean that space and time also do not exist? Furthermore, some of those areas will be responsible for subconscious processing of emotions, because emotions (salience) are crucial for people to learn. When I used to learn algebra, I actually felt the numbers through emotions: there were tricky variables, benevolent ones, etc. Math may or may not be a product of my mind (corresponding to objective reality or not), but I think it's silly to say that mathematical calculations are merely emotions.

Yes, it makes sense that our brain would express moral valuations through a feeling of disgust. But that doesn't necessarily mean that our moral judgments are simply products of feelings. That's just the "language" of the brain. Sometimes our brain uses one set of qualia to represent another set of information. Pain (or taste) feels as hot or sharp. It doesn't mean that temperature, pain, acute tactile pressure, and taste are the same thing.

Also, one should not discount the idea that subconscious processing of values could elicit subconscious emotional reactions. Another brain area that lights up consistently during moral choices is medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC). It is the area responsible for planning and execution of actions, but also for thinking about different outcomes and switching between strategies. It is one of the most advanced part of the human brain phylogenetically. Is mPFC being driven by the emotional centers? Does it drive them? Is there a more complicated picture? The causality is not clear, and I don't believe the state-of-the art fMRI can reveal it.

A ma'amor summary

First, I changed my mind on moving to Tumblr.

Second, here is a ma'amor summary I wrote on Facebook:


Alter Rebbe says that people nowadays (meaning 18th/19th century — but this is true also today) think that the philosophers of old were fools. It is the philosophers of today that were able to develop wonderful new technological advances (the Alter Rebbe gives examples of cannons and air balloons) that are the geniuses.

In reality, he says, it's the opposite. People of old were geniuses, but they dealt with inyonim ruchniim — spiritual matters, or abstract concepts. The reason was that it was important to mekadesh (to make holy) the world from top to bottom. That is why the wise of the nations dealt with the abstract concepts, so that Yidden could mekadesh those concepts through their service.

Nowadays, the time has come to mekadesh the gashmius, the lowest aspects of the physical matter. This is why around the time of 17th-19th centuries, there was a revolution both in Chassidus (the ideas in Judaism that explain how dealing with physical things for the purpose of holiness creates "dira b'tachtoinim", Dwelling in the Lower Worlds for G-d) and in material sciences (natural sciences, medicine, economics, etc.) that allowed for more of the physical matter to be in use by the humans, more efficiently, and with greater benefit for the humanity. And economics is very important for this, because it allows literally the whole world to participate in creation of a single pencil.

Now this pencil (or an iPhone or an airplane) can be used for humanity's benefit and for avoidas Hashem. Through study of Chassidus, we are able to elevate the sparks even in the lowest aspects of the matter. Through study of natural sciences, we are able to make those aspects of the matter accessible for elevation. Furthermore, study of the world itself, combined with Chassidus, allows us to understand the greatness of G-d to a higher degree.

I believe it's the law

I often hear the phrase "it's the law" from random people, family members, friends, enemies, and well-wishers. People use the phrase the same way as they would say "square root of 121 is 11" or "F = ma". I.e., some binding truth.

In reality, yes, laws should be binding. But not positive secular laws. Positive secular laws are just some arbitrary rules that a bunch of people with most guns came up with for the rest of people. So, what is the moral or praxeological force of the argument "It's the law"? Why should I care? (Obviously, if there is a police thug around, I should care, but that's the same as saying "This is Black Ravens' turf". I.e., I should care for the same reason I should be careful walking late at night on some gang's territory — because thugs are dangerous. But imagine if I could do something that a particular gang dislikes without them finding out — why shouldn't I?)

Now, there is a concept of natural laws. For example, there are natural laws of physics. They are binding in the sense that you have no choice but live according to them. If you walk out of the tenth floor's window, you will have no choice but to learn about the law of gravitation.

There are laws of economics. They are equally binding. For instance, if the government enacts a minimum wage regulation, this leads to a greater unemployment among the low-wage earners, becomes it becomes unprofitable to hire them at the minimum wage if the latter is greater than the marginal profit one might derive from them.

There are laws of linguistics. The word peace is a synonym of tranquility, while the word piece is a synonym of portion. What is the source of this law? Not the dictionary. If one published a dictionary that said that dog is "a flying reptile that makes hissing sounds", you would say that the author of the dictionary made a mistake. What dictionary writers do is observe the behavior of people and codify it, not much differently from the way that neuroscientists observe the behavior of neurons or particle physicists observe the behavior of subatomic particles.

(source)

So, what about social law? Well, it's no different. If people want to speak to each other, they have to obey the laws of a particular language that spontaneously arose in evolutionary way as a result of people communicating with each other. If people want to live in peace and tranquility, they have to observe natural laws of society. A simple example of a natural raw is driving on the right side in the US and on the left side in the UK. These laws are in place not because some organization with a lot of guns decided so, but because if you're going to go on the left side of the road in the US, that would be like saying "accurate" when you mean "fastidious" (the two words are Russian–English linguistic "false friends").

But natural civil laws are more than just customs. They are natural ways for people to live in tranquility, which is the whole point of civil laws. (Note that the purpose of the civil laws is not to uphold morality or increase wealth. The former is done by religious laws or concept that are similar to religion. The latter is done by laws of economics. I know it might sound shocking, but I don't see why. It's also not the point of the civil laws to maximize your pet fish's lifespan or make sure your shoes fit well.)

Sometimes living in tranquility depends on observing a custom (such as driving on the side of the road on which the majority is driving); sometimes it depends simply on using logic to figure out what sort of behavior leads to minimization of conflict. The concept of natural rights is one such logical tool. Logically, the best way to minimize conflict is to assign claims to property between individuals based on homesteading or transfer of property. Law is necessary to codify and acknowledge the natural rights — not to create them.

[It is true that positive law exists in Judaism, but in that case it is based on Divine Law, which is a kind of natural law. I.e., G-d tells Chazal that they have a responsibility to safeguard Torah and therefore can (and must, if they find so necessary) create new laws that would be binding.

But you should notice that in Judaism today there is also the concept of codification of existing laws and legal opinions and customs; not arbitrary positive legislation.]

So, the next time someone tells you that something is a law because the government said so, tell him that that's not the case. The government cannot create laws. It can only acknowledge them. When the government makes an edict that contradicts natural rights (for instance, that one must pay one's taxes or one must do certain repairs to one's car or one can force someone else to pay for his health insurance), the edict's binding force from natural legal point of view is the same as the binding force of an entry in a dictionary that defines "cactus" as "a prehistoric marine animal". You may stick to your guns and use that definition, but it won't help you reach your goal.

By the way, I am not, by far, the first one to use this concept. Torah says that if Hashem did not give us certain rules of behavior we could learn them from animals or use our reason to come up with them (not all of them are civil laws; some are laws of morality, for instance, modesty, or laws of hygiene). The concept of natural law was upheld by ancient Greek philosophers, by medieval Christian and Muslim philosophers, by Western philosophers of the 17th–19th centuries; it is the concept that is the foundation of the Declaration of Independence.

The above was inspired by this video:



For more on the topic of natural laws, listen to this lecture — or watch the following video (in the first part of the lecture, he discusses the mechanism through which private laws would be "discovered" or "determined" in a free society):



For historic examples of natural laws in a society, see:
— Medieval Iceland as an example of private law creation and enforcement
— Medieval Ireland: an example of a libertarian legal system

Effect of income tax on technological progress

[A re-post with some new points]

Oftentimes people tell me that science would not flourish as it has in the 20th century had it not been sponsored by income tax. The idea of private sponsorship of science (either in a form of investments, like in any other business, or in a form of donations) would not work, or at least would not work on the same scale as it has under governmental sponsorship. Until recently, I thought so too.

Let’s see if this is true — what effect has income tax (introduced in the late 19th century and made permanent in early 20th century) and, in general, government’s funding of science had on the rate of technological breakthroughs?




I think the effect is pretty clear. Until the end of 19th century, technology has been developing at an extremely high rate. Then, in late 19th – early 20th century, the rate started to slow down and then started to decrease. Saying “look how far we got in 20th century in terms of technology after government started sponsoring its development” is the same as saying “look how far I got walking on my feet after I abandoned my car on the side of the road”.

Recently someone told me that without inflation, there is no growth (apparently, Rick Santorum believes the same). I answered that England and US have grown tremendously in the period of 1700–1900 (when the currency was not only not inflating, but was actually deflating). He said: "yes, but it was the fraction of growth US has experienced in the last thirty years". I challenged him to provide me with evidence that the rate of growth was higher in the 20th century than in the 19th. Meanwhile, Tom Woods claims the opposite:



Going back to the question of governmental funding of science — so, why would private businesses fund science (after all, aren’t they interested in immediate profit?), and why don’t they do so now? Also, even if the businesses did fund science (and of course, they still do), it would be only applied, not fundamental science, right?

This claim is repeated by most scientists I know. No wonder most of them love the government.

Well, think about this: oil companies invest money in geological research that will produce real profit 30 years from now. Sounds to me like investment into fundamental science that gives long-term profit. (I certainly hope that my personal discoveries will provide humanity, iyH, with some practical benefit, in addition to added theoretical knowledge, less than 30 years from now.)

Now, imagine if the government used taxpayers’ money to do the aforementioned geological research? Why would the oil companies spend money to do it then?

Meanwhile, the cost of doing science has risen greatly, because the companies that supply universities with materials know they can raise the prices, since the government will pick up the bill. The same is happening in medicine and education.

At the same time, the quality of service is going down. It is very hard to buy a good antibody nowadays (as opposed to, say, 10 years ago), since the market is full of antibodies that do not work or don’t work well. The companies mass-produce them and sell them, knowing that the government-sponsored labs will buy them no matter what, since they are less careful with their money spending (after all, the government will pick up the bill, and if you run out of one grant, there is always another to be applied for).

And this is just one example...

G-d or nature?

(source)

[a re-post, with a link to a Chanukah-related post... keep reading]

A little red ball just made me think about G-d, nature, and G-d in nature.

I drove to my house and parked my car in the driveway. My neighbor’s car is parked by the sidewalk, and next to the rear-right wheel of the car I saw a small red rubber ball. The neighbors on the other side of my house have children, so I thought it might belong to one of them and kicked the ball in the direction of the house. (No, the ball didn’t break the window — although that would make for a better story.)

The ball went to the side of the street, but then rolled onto the street itself, where it actually would be more likely to be run over. Then, the wind rolled it gently back towards my neighbors’ house and down the slope of the street, until the ball stopped — you guessed it — where I picked it up to begin with, my neighbor’s car’s right-rear wheel.

As a result I had a few thoughts:

1. Hashgacha protis. Eibeshter wants the ball to be right there, because even a silly red ball can have a G-dly purpose, and anyway, G-d controls every atom of the Universe.

2. Nature. Don’t be silly! That place is just a stable position for the ball on the street. What we would call in chemistry the state of least energy, or, in computational neuroscience, an attractor state. It’s a position, which, despite the sundry chaotic forces of the street (wind, gravity, friction, relief of the street, car, my kicking the ball), is the most stable for the ball at the moment and to which it tends to return.

As it happens, wind blows the ball towards my house, but not hard enough for it to climb the sidewalk, and, since the street is slopped, it rolls down, until it’s stopped by the car’s rear wheel (since the car is parked a bit at an angle). This is how the Universe operates. On the quantum level, it’s events like this and their combining probabilities that result in all deterministic complexity that we see in our world. Every time you take an aspirin or eat a bagel, you expect certain reactions to go exact way — with electrons dancing their little dance, bonds breaking and forming, etc. But in the end of the day, it’s no different from the red ball (in fact, much-much more chaotic and unpredictable).




3. Why can’t it be both 1 and 2?

Why can’t we say that sure, the Universe operates according to its laws, which include, yes, the laws of probability and least-energy-states and stable-state attractors — and at the same time, G-d is present in all this?

Not in the sense that He set it all up and now observes from the side (only interfering sometimes) how the clock of the Universe ticks away through its own energy, invested in it by Bing Bang or whatever initial “winding” — which is the view of the school of Chakirah (philosophy). But no, in the sense that G-d is actively, immediately, omnipresently, omnisciously, omnipotently, omni-etc. involved in the affairs of the Universe, of every electron making a decision whether to jump from one orbital to another or not — and at the same time, electrons’ movement can be described through probabilistic laws of quantum mechanics, emergence of species can be described through theory of evolution and so on.

Sounds impossible? Well, if G-d can pull of Chanukah, I think he can pull off nimna ha’nimnois in nature.

* * *

This is the point of Malchus — the idea that “converted me” to Chassidus (OK, it was a little more sophisticated, but this is where it started). Malchus is the last sphera of the Seideir Hishtalshelus, the chain of creation, 10 forces with which G-d creates and controls every world. Malchus represents kingship — and, at the same time, concealment. Мalchus is a salesman (actually, а saleswoman). It tells the world what the world wants to hear — that it exists and G-d does not. And this allows the world to exist.

So, how does this lead to His Kingship? Zohar states: “King donned his robes and rose on his throne”. It is precisely through the concealment of Himself — the ultimate concealment, which allows us to think that electrons are moving by themselves, in the sea of chaotic forces — that G-d becomes a king in this world.

See, it’s no fun to be a king over a bunch of robots, programmed to follow your will. You are not really a king. To be a king, you need those capable of making a free decision to obey or disobey you (“No king without a nation”) — and when they choose to obey you, you become a king. Also, when G-d’s presence and kingship are revealed in the spiritual worlds, it’s no big deal. It’s like lighting a dry match, dipped in oil, with a lot of oxygen around. “Look, it burns!” Of course it burns. Lighting a match under water — that’s the trick. When G-d becomes the King over this world, made seemingly independent and G-dless through Malchus, then He really is a King.

(And the point is that the physical world is not only a make-belief world of darkness, but the world of darkness mamosh. I mean, do you really think that G-d can conceal Himself on the level of a forest, but not trees? On the level of a table, but not the electrons that the table is made of?)

We cannot discard the nature — even the nature that tells us, “Look, I exist and operate perfectly well without G-d”. As it states in Torah, “Bereishis bara Elokim” (Elokim davka) — G-d created this world, and He wants it to exist. At the same time, He wants it (the same dark, lying world) to be a home for Himself, in the paradoxical state of events that only He can pull off.

But for that to happen, we need to invite Him and make this world into a G-dly place, without — at the same time — breaking it. We do that by literally uniting the nature (and its probabilistic and deterministic laws) with the Essence of G-d. How? By taking a candle and lighting it before Shabbos. By taking tefillin and wrapping it every morning. By learning Torah with our physical brains. Because, as Tanya explains (Ch-s 4 and 5), G-d invested His Essence (which is one with His Will) in Torah and mitzvos.

Bы following and learning Torah, we are making G-d into King of the Universe and are inviting Him into this world. We are bringing close that time when His Kingship and Essence will be revealed.

Albert Einstein on music

If I were not a physicist, I would probably be a musician. I often think in music. I see my life in terms of music. I get most joy in life out of music.
— Albert Einstein

As is well known, Einstein played a violin. I find it interesting how strong his opinions on music were. (Also, this touches the question of taste vs. objective quality, but I won’t go into that here.) From here (quoted from Albert Einstein: The Human Side, where I read it first when I was doing a paper on Einstein’s Dreams by Alan Lightman). From his answers to a questionnaire regarding his taste in music:

(1) Bach, Mozart, and some old Italian and English composers are my favorites in music. Beethoven considerably less — but certainly Schubert.

(2) It is impossible for me to say whether Bach or Mozart means more to me. In music I do not look for logic. I am quite intuitive on the whole and know no theories. I never like a work if I cannot intuitively grasp its inner unity (architecture).

(3) I always feel that Handel is good — even perfect — but that he has a certain shallowness. Beethoven is for me too dramatic and too personal.

(4) Schubert is one of my favorites because of his superlative ability to express emotion and his enormous powers of melodic invention. But in his larger works I am disturbed by a certain lack of architectonics [German: "Architektonik"].

(5) Schumann is attractive to me in his smaller works because of their originality and richness of feeling, but his lack of formal greatness prevents my full enjoyment. In Mendelssohn I perceive considerable talent but an indefinable lack of depth that often leads to banality.

(6) I find a few lieder and chamber works by Brahms truly signficant, also in their structure. But most of his works have for me no inner persuasiveness. I do not understand why it was necessary to write them.

(7) I admire Wagner's inventiveness, but I see his lack of architectural structure as decadence. Moreover, to me his musical personality is indescribably offensive so that for the most part I can listen to him only with disgust.

(8) I feel that [Richard] Strauss is gifted, but without inner truth and concerned only with outside effects. I cannot say that I care nothing for modern music in general. I feel that Debussy is delicately colorful but shows a poverty of structure. I cannot work up great enthusiasm for something of that sort.

It certainly makes me feel better about my tastes. Not in the sense that they “agree” with Einstein’s — I am rather fond of Beethoven, for instance — but in the sense that I feel less guilty not appreciating some famous musicians (I don’t particularly like Chopin, for example, to my chavrussa’s disgust). On the other hand, it is more likely that I don’t appreciate them because I have bad or undeveloped taste and no first-hand knowledge of music, while Einstein’s taste was probably grounded on something more substantial.

Decisions, decisions...

Please answer the new two polls.

In the first poll, it’s very important to know that I am not talking about Halacha (of course, preserving your health is Halacha, but the question here is how to do it most effectively). For example, in many works of Chassidus it says that signal transduction between the brain and the foot takes no time. Modern science says that it does, and this has been shown beyond any shadow of doubt. If you have to make a decision (for yourself or others) between, say, two courses of treatment: one assuming that there is no time lag, and one assuming that there is, which one would you choose?

(If you don’t care about works of Chassidus, pick something in Gemara or something in the words of Rishoinim or Acharoinim, etc.)

In the second poll, I am asking for the deepest possible answer. Obviously, a person could have all four motivations in mind — I am asking which one is the most important. Also, when I say “it’s morally wrong”, I mean something which is objectively and naturally wrong — whether or not there was a gezeira from Hashem telling you it’s wrong (and whether or not you know that Hashem will be pleased, if such an arrangement is possible). And, I am asking you to give a realistic answer about yourself — i.e., what your motivation is. Not what it should be.

Get a job!

Jensen and Smith (Journal of Population Economics, 1990) report:

This paper analyzes the effects of unemployment on the probability of marital dissolution. Based on panel data for a sample of Danish married couples, we estimate a dynamic model for the probability of marital dissolution where we take into account the possible effects of unemployment for both spouses. We also control for other factors such as education, age, presence of children, place of residence, health and economic factors. The empirical results show that unemployment seems to be an important factor behind marital instability. However, only unemployment of the husband has an effect, and this effect is immediate.

Who knew, eh?

The only question is: would the above study consider husbands who warm the bench sitting and learning Gemara (and take the numerous coffee breaks) all day long employed or unemployed?

(For the cynics in the audience: no, I didn’t change my opinion of the so-called social “sciences”. I only quote from their studies when they support my point of view.)

Molecular Biology and oral tradition

This post is not about Biology. But it may pollute your neshama, if you’re not careful. Better take your laptop to the bathroom while reading this (read the last line here).

A conversation between a graduate student, a technician and a post-doc:

— Can you precipitate cDNA-1 for only 3 hours after RT [reverse transcriptase reaction]?
— How many cells?
— 50.
— Hmm. No, I wouldn’t do it. Do overnight. By the way, you know, some people precipitate at room temperature. I don’t believe it [the method].
— You don’t believe it?
— I’ve never done it myself.
— I’ve heard people precipitating not at −20 but at +4.
— I’ve never seen these data. You can try and tell us how it looks. But the more important part is spinning.
— For 30 minutes?
— Some people do even 10 minutes. I would do an hour if you’re worried.

Later:

— Here’s some DNAse. But you know, K. warned me it’s fragile. Be gentle with it.
— Be gentle with it?
— Yes, don’t mix it by pipetting up-and-down. Just tap it, like you do with other enzymes for RT.
— OK, so how much do you add?
— Hold on, I have it here. [Takes the protocol for the main reaction. The notes for DNase application are hand-written on the margin.]
— Thanks. Let me copy that.

Oral tradition... And much of this stuff is like black magic. So much of it seems subjective, but it works. Discoveries are made. Cancer is treated much more successfully. We know so much more about brain development.

Much of it is in the books, protocols, published. But the way the information is transmitted is, at least initially, from person to person. And many of the tricks are not written anywhere. Most importantly, it’s nearly impossible to follow a protocol successfully without someone physically showing you how at least once.

I wonder if this is how the transmission of mesoira looked like.

Legacy of Galen, or Tradition, tradition! (Part 3)

I was reading some time ago the biography of Aelius Galenus, aka Claudius Galenus, aka Galen of Pergamum, known to most of people today simply as Galen, the famous doctor and anatomist of Roman Empire. Now, the figure of Galen is near and dear to the hearts of all students of Chassidus Chabad, since anatomy and physiology that can be found in the works of Chassidus (e.g., Tanya — including the famous descriptions of compartments of the heart, one’s seed coming from one’s brain, etc.) is borrowed from Galen.

But that’s not the reason that I am mentioning him today. As one could tell from a series of a few recent posts, I have been pondering for a while about the role of tradition in the life of a human being, a Jew, a Chossid and an amateur philatelist. Some of my thoughts are more positive, some are more negative (positive and negative in what aspect, you ask? good question...), some are more traditional (no pun intended), some are more heretical. After this meta-paragraph, let me present to you the part of Galen’s biography that caught my attention, namely, his legacy (you can skip to the bottom line after the quotes if you so desire):

Not in peasant years

Life! Don't talk to me about life.

— Marvin

I attended a really awesome talk by a visiting post-doc this morning. In which he talked about squirrels, college students, pregnant women whose brains should be drunk but are not, hibernation and bloodletting.

Al Gore liked this movie

The digital film is called Oceansize, it’s in German, and its main idea is: Mother Nature strikes back.

Oceansize from Oceansize Team on Vimeo.

Learning Tanya — two ways to view the world

(“Response” = egocentric strategy; “Place” = allocentric strategy)

In Neuroscience and Psychology, two strategies of navigation are described. The first strategy, egocentric, tries to memorize turns. It envisions the world rotating around self and connects in sequence the places where one must turn or go straight. The second strategy, allocentric, visualizes one on a map and tries to calculate how to get from where one is right now to where one’s goal is. What one sees in one’s mind is not the world rotating around oneself, but oneself being a dot on the world’s map. (See the picture above.)

There are two types of people who learn Tanya. People from the first group, as they learn, try to figure out what Tanya does for their own spiritual development, their closeness with G-d, their internal growth. People from the second group ask the questions: “In what way do I know more about how to serve my Creator? What am I lacking, and how can I cause more pleasure to Hashem and fulfill the purpose for which He created the world?”

The second group of people, following allocentric and altruistic strategy, are the true Lubavitch chassidim. (And the only reason, by the way, that they see in Tanya explaining how one can become truly joyous is that being joyous is a key to being the best possible servant of G-d. A depressed soul does not make dwelling place for G-d in this world as successfully. So, in the end, it’s all about making a keli — out of oneself — for G-d.)

* * *

One more thing. Just because one learns Tanya, it doesn’t mean he is not a misnaged or someone who dislikes Chabad. It just means he is not a complete ignoramus. It doesn’t take much to recognize that a modern Jew must learn Tanya.

(Source of the figure: “The Role of the Basal Ganglia in Habit Formation”; Yin and Knowlton, 2006)

Of galaxies and raspberries

I actually don’t know if I like this news, because I never liked raspberries. I was always suspicious of them harboring some alien life forms inside — and a mashgiach friend of mine once confirmed my hunch. In any event, if that is true, now we know why.



By the way, in case you’re wondering what that big gaping darkness in the middle of the galaxy is — yes, it’s a black hole. At least we suspect it is. No one has actually seen it.

Saving the planet

I am not sure if there is a better example of a typical liberal action and its consequences than this. This even beats my car-turning example.

Meanwhile, what’s really saving our planet is its magnetic field. Where does it come from? From the liquid metallic core churning inside the planet (your car’s alternator works similarly). Why is the core churning? Because of the moon, which is exactly right distance from the earth not only to cause the tides, but to make the liquid core move.


(source)

Had there not been the moon, the magnetic field would not exist, resulting in massive solar radiation preventing all life on Earth from existing. Not only due to the damage of the radiation itself, but because the “solar wind” would destroy and “strip” the atmosphere away — as can be observed in the North, where magnetic field is weak, and the solar radiation “burns up” the atmosphere (many miles above the Earth surface), resulting in the northern lights.

Demonstration of magnetic field (and the basic principle of an electric motor, i.e., opposite of alternator):

Science progress in giant strides

Already we can see the effects the One President’s Wise Programs — in this case, on science. Let no evil tongues tell you otherwise.



And people are asking, what the hell does the Spendulus money go to? Why spend $500 million on monitoring volcano activity? Now you know, you dummy.

Thoughts on Theory of Evolution

One of several thoughts from starting to read The Hand by Frank R. Wilson.

My problem with obsession with the Theory of Evolution is not that I don’t believe in TE. I do. I mean, I believe the facts. If the facts contradict each other, I can try to find the way to reconcile them (as in contradiction of Quantum Mechanics and General Theory of Relativity), bend one set of facts to another, or just let the contradiction be. And I believe that I really can reconcile Evolution and Judaism.

So, I accept Evolution as a fact, albeit perhaps interpreted by me differently from the most. The problem appears when people start defining their lives according the Evolution, defining the essence of humanity. Defining me, after all.

Because I don’t believe that. Whatever facts I may believe, I am still a theist, a Chassidic Orthodox religious Jew whose outlook on the definition and essence of life, its purpose and its meaning derives from Judaism. Facts are facts. They are out there. The world looks old. Nu. The species look like they share common ancestry. Nu. Perhaps they do — in physical, or, more likely, in mystical sense (which practically yields the same consequences). Nu.

But these things don’t define me. The purpose with which my Creator sent me into this world does.

At the same I could see how these things would most meaningfully define an atheist’s life. Or perhaps not — I don’t know what would meaningfully define an atheist’s life (just like I don’t know what would be his meaningful definition of morality) without him being intellectually dishonest, ignorant, stupid or lying to himself.

But perhaps this is what irritates the Conservatives about TE, which I never understood (the theory being for me just a scientific, biological fact and a useful model for interpreting and representing data, not any life-defining or -changing set of principles or ideas).

Something to consider

“Mench tracht un G-tt lacht” (“Man plans and G-d laughs”).

But we have to try our best. And more often than not our best is not good enough — so, we need to try to do better. Because we are expected to. Otherwise, what’s the point? Tell me, what is the point otherwise?

Exactly…