Legal breakdown

Sorry I haven't posted for a while. Too busy getting a Ph.D. ... and stuff.

A re-post from Facebook:

Supreme Court Rules Drug Companies Exempt from Lawsuits in 5-4 Vote - Waking Times

Of course, free markets and capitalism are to blame for this, not the corrupt legal system of this country.

This is the same situation as with the environmental pollution 100-150 years ago, when the courts sided with large companies (owners of industrial plants, railroads, etc.) in lawsuits brought against the latter by their smaller neighbors. Fast-forward 100 years, and suddenly everyone is environment-conscious and blaming capitalism, free markets, deregulation, profit, and freedom for the environment being messed up... and of course calling for more government!

But what happened then and what is happening now is not "market failure", but a dysfunction within the state-operated monopolized legal system. One single function that the government is theoretically supposed to do — protect people's rights — it has failed at again and again. And everyone, from the right and from the left, is calling for more government in those areas where it's not supposed to be involved at all, when the only solution is more privatization: including that of the legal system!

And, unsurprisingly, the neocon "justices" voted for the corporatist outcome. The two parties in this country are not liberals vs. conservatives. These terms made some sense in the 19th-century UK, but not the US today (Hayek discusses this quite well in his essay "Why I Am Not a Conservative".) Today it's socialists vs. fascists. Pick your poison.

Real boundaries

There are two major kinds of maps that people tend to use: geographic and political. The first kind represents the nature: landscape features of the land. The second presumably represent people living on the land.

But does it? It surely represents the boundaries of political authority that is imposed from the top, but does it say anything meaningful about the people themselves (besides the fact that in this place people tolerate the fact that they were forced to choose between Bob and Bill, and in that place they tolerate the fact that they were forced to choose between Joe and Jim)?

This new approach to mapping human activity challenges this notion. Briefly, the authors of the approach propose to draw boundaries based on "how far a buck travels": the extent of people's economic activity. The other approach is to try clustering the exchanges of money for products and services. I tend to buy a lot of my stuff locally. I also tend to order some things from a few online stores centered in certain locations. So, I tend to spend my money in the area where I live (with reduced probability of spending with the distance) and in a few "hubs".

Another approach is to try mapping communication: cell phone calls between places. Or employment: how far do people travel to work. Or personal interaction. Etc.

Using one of these approaches, US map becomes this:



Or this:



(You can read more in the report on the methodology of creating these maps.)

Notice how rarely the political boundaries correspond with the "real" boundaries of human interaction. (It seems that in most cases that they do, there is also a physical boundary like a river or a mountain range that obviously serves as real boundary for human interaction.)

On the other hand, the political map of Great Britain, a much older country, tends to correlate somewhat better with the country's political map:



The map actually looks somewhat similar to the Anglo-Saxon and Celtic kingdoms that existed before the Danish invasion in the 9th century CE:



I wonder if these patterns correlate with geographic features or just with traditional established economic centers.

But another, much stronger, point that immediately jumps to one's attention is that thinking of communities in terms of little bounded areas with well-established lines is silly. At best, the lines are very fuzzy. But it's also the case that the communication between people, especially in our times, is so fluid, dynamic and far-ranging that thinking of nations and communities in terms of boundaries seems unjustified.

Much better to think of them in terms of connections that unite people rather than borders that divide them:

The British are coming

Robert Murphy comments on Facebook:

Now people are arguing with me about whether the government has plans on how it would implement martial law, if it had to. Of *course* they have such plans. They developed a plan for taking out Great Britain. That's what these people think their *job* is. Don't you people watch movies?

War Plan Red

My thoughts:

There was once a point when having heard something conspiracy-like about USA being an evil empire (whether from crazy American liberals or Russians or Soviet books), I would roll my eyes. "Sure, it's not perfect, but..."

Then came a point when I realized that all those cynical things being said about the USA being a wannabe policeman of the world for the purpose of fulfilling the interests of a few major corporations may not be so crazy after all.

I guess I have passed that point by now. When I read about US having had a secret plan of fighting the British Empire, I am not even surprised...

I mean, look at these. There is a Russian obscene joke about a little boy looking through a keyhole into his parents' bedroom and exclaiming: "And they tell me not to pick my nose!" American presidents talk about international threats to peace, while USA probably at this point has a contingency plan of taking over the moon.

Martial law? Meh...

Democracy and the illusion of public ownership

Today, in a shower, I put a finger on what I subconsciously understood to be wrong with democracy. And so I hurry to share it with my (potential) faithful audience.

What's wrong with democracy is that it is an actualization of the legal fiction of public ownership. Let me explain what I mean.

Imagine that 500 people presumably own some public property: let's say, a central square. That's our premise.

Now, by 'ownership' I mean 'legitimate control'. When I own something I can control it (and we agree that I am doing so legitimately): I can decide what its fate is: I can use it, leave it alone, allow others to use, or forbid others from using it (even if I am not using it at the moment myself). A funny counter-example is a story of Ludwig Wittgenstein who once told him that he would give me some trees growing nearby as a present, as long as the student agrees never to use or alter them in any way or prevent the previous owners from using them in whatever way they wish. The point was to illustrate what ownership is: it's legitimate ability to exercise control over something and prevent others from doing so. If you don't have that, then your "owning" of something is merely academic.

Next comes democracy.

People elect a mayor of the village who will decide what happens to the public square. 251 people vote for Bob, while 249 vote for Bill. Bob becomes the mayor and decides to plant a tree in the public square, against the wishes of 400 people. But, they can't do anything about it, because Bob was elected through a democratic process. 'Next time we will be wiser', say the 400 people (or, at least those that voted for Bob) and walk home.

Let's see what happened here. There were two acts of aggression:

1. When 251 people imposed Bob as the village mayor on the 249. The argument that had it been the reverse (with Bill becoming the mayor), it would be worse, may be true, but it doesn't refute that electing Bob was an act of violence.

2. When Bob decided to plant a tree against the people's wishes.

So, first we had an act of oppression of the minority at the hands of a majority (249 vs. 251), which in itself created the oppression of majority at the hands of a minority (the villagers vs. Bob). But since the first act is meaningless in and of itself (if by the village's constitution, Bob couldn't do anything, then his election would not be a meaningful act of any sort), the essence of representative democracy, as we have discovered, is the same old oppression of majorities at the hands of minorities, which we had back when we had monarchy.

The difference is that the majority of the people get to decide who the jerk on the throne is going to be*. The difference between monarchy and representative democracy is, therefore, what I call 'economic'. It's not a principled difference, it's a difference of the expected practical outcome. Sometimes the 'economic' expectation works out, sometimes it doesn't. (Certainly, publicly elected officials have done more damage than the kings, but perhaps that's because they had better technology and more people at their hands.)

The same goes for constitutional democracy: the basis for preferring it (an expectation that it would somehow curb the abuses of the elected 'jerk') is economic. Sometimes it proves to be true; sometimes it doesn't. Certainly American constitutional democracy has proven to be a failure to a large extent. Today, most people don't even understand what constitutionality means.

So what then? Direct democracy? Well, first of all, as all of you thought the moment you read these words, it's economically unfeasible for a large number of reasons. Second, it creates the same oppression of the minority at the hands of the majority (although, true, it doesn't create the second step of the new oppression of a new majority at the hands of elected minority).

So, at least under absolute monarchy, there are no illusions: the king owns the land, and he decides what happens on his property. End of story.

Of course, economically, it's better if there are many small private owners (each deciding what's going on on his property, and private competing judicial 'authorities' arbitrating arising disputes), but that's another discussion.


But this is what I thought about in the shower: what's particularly funny about the above situation with the villagers and the central square is that the whole time they are being oppressed (by either majorities or minorities) the people live under an illusion that they somehow own the public property. In reality, however, the elected official owns it, at least to the extent that the tolerance of the people will allow him (directly or through some constitutional mechanism).

Imagine the following scenario: a family of five decide to buy a dinner. They vote for milchiks vs. fleishigs, and four out five decide to get a pizza. The fifth person has to go along, and when they are eating the pie, he complains about the taste. One of the four looks at him and says: "Well, don't complain now -- you bought it!"
__________
* A more sophisticated reader may point to the idea of government with consent. So, the difference between a democracy and a monarchy is that in the first case, people in charge govern with the consent of the majority. But that again is fallacious: how do you know that every decision is made with the public's consent? We don't make an argument that the king rules with the consent of the governed: we check it, through elections (and the elections show that it's difficult to predict, without actual verification through voting, whom the majority supports). But if we are going to verify through voting that the president and Congress have the consent of the majority for every law they pass, then we might as well have a direct democracy!

Otherwise, we are back to the situation where every time the government passes a law, it goes against public wishes (or at least without any evidence of public agreement) regarding what should be done with the public's presumed property.

Lacanian psychoanalysis of Chabad and Modern Orthodox Judaism

(Slavoj Žižek, post-modernist troublemaker)

I am going to try to analyze Chabad and Modern Orthodoxy using the psychoanalytic approach of Lacanian triad: 'the imaginary, the symbolic, and the real' (I'll explain below).

I want to do this because I have for a long time thought about the dichotomy of the 'real' and the 'imaginary' in the MO world. In addition, recently, I have read Iraq: the Borrowed Kettle by Slavoj Žižek (pronounced as 'Slah-voy Zhih-zhek'), a Marxist philosopher-psychoanalyst. I obviously disagree with many of Žižek's ideas and conclusions about capitalism and the Western world, but I find his analytic methodology entertaining. (So, keep this in mind as you read the bits of this post about the Iraqi war. What matters is not the contents, but the analysis.)

In Iraq, Žižek analyzed the motivations for the 2003 invasion of Iraq using Lacanian psychoanalytic triad:

1. The imaginary: the purpose of the war was to spread the ideals and the benefits of the Western democracy. This was the official propaganda line fed to the masses in order to garner their support.

2. The symbolic: the purpose of the war was to spread American political hegemony. This level is called symbolic because the invasion of Iraq really served a 'symbolic' purpose in the international diplomatic stance of the USA: it strengthened its roles as the international policeman and 'paved the way' for the possibility and acceptability of now starting the war on the 'imaginary' grounds, without support of the UN, and in a form of preemptive strikes.

3. The real reason for the invasion, according to Žižek, was economic control over Iraqi oil and, more generally, strengthening of US dollar against the euro. (Perhaps one can tie in the Keynesian motive for mythical 'stimulus' of the economy through defense spending.) This is classical of Žižekian analysis of political events: he envisions a nation-state, a government, or a culture (e.g., the USA) as an individual, and applies to it Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalysis, showing that (in his opinion) the sub-conscious drive is the real one.

Now, let me say at once that I do not necessarily agree with the above analysis of Iraqi war. Or, rather, I neither agree nor disagree. It is certainly the case that the invasion has failed on all three accounts: it did not help with spreading of democracy, either in the region or in the world; it has ruined US political image and led to diplomatic and military backlash, and it had an adverse effect on US economy on multiple levels, including, in the long-term, the current Great Recession. Of course, that doesn't mean that Zizek is wrong in his analysis of motivations.

As Kelsey Wood notes in Žižek: A Reader's Guide:

Žižek is careful to point out that in this Lacanian triad of imaginary-symbolic-real, each of these three levels has some degree of autonomy, and none of the is simply a mere semblance (Iraq, p.4). For example, ideological fantasy produces effects in people's behavior, and has an impact on people's lives. This indicates how fantasy is constitutive of symbolic reality. But again, with regard to the triad of imaginary-symbolic-real, 'it is not that one is the "truth" of the others; the "truth" is, rather, the very shift of perspective between them' (Iraq, p.6).

Again, I do not care whether or not Zizek's analysis is true. I care about using this method to analyse both MO and Chabad branches of 'frum' Judaism.

Let me start with Chabad, using davening as an example (I am crediting my wife for giving me this idea):

1. The imaginary: on this level, we look at davening through 'general' Orthodox Judaism. I.e., all the halachos of davening, the nusach, what davening consists of (the parts of davening), the zmanim, etc. Also, the purpose of davening as interpreted by Alter Rebbe: connection to Hashem.

The 'imaginary' level can also be termed 'ideal' or 'formal'. In a chess game, the 'imaginary' dimension of a chess piece is the rules by which it moves. A synonymous expression for 'imaginary' is 'make-belief', and that applies to the religious application of the Lacanian triad: the 'imaginary' aspect is not something that is not real (G-d forbid), but it is something one must believe in, or at least it's not something accessible to one's immediate experience; it is both a foundation and a goal, both of which must exist on the level of emunah-like commitment (you can read here more about the distinction between emunah and da'as).

2. The symbolic: when looked at through Chabad Chassidus, davening is not simply carrying out of the halachic obligation, but a path of self-development, literally an avoida ('service'). Again, I am using the 'symbolic' as merely Lacanian jargon. In an abstract sense, the act of prayer itself (i.e., what is literally a supplication) is a 'symbol' (an excuse, if you wish) for improving oneself and establishing a relationship with Hashem.

For that purpose, one must daven at length, with great concentration (oftentimes outside of the minyan), and, most significantly, one must learn Chassidus before davening, so that one can be hisboinen (contemplative, meditative) of the learned concepts (comprising either haskallah, the intellectual concepts, or avoida, the concepts of self-service, of Chassidus, or both). This has effect on the interpretation of Halacha (the first level), since, to fulfill the 'symbolic' aspect of davening, we must be lax with the zmanim, allow eating before davening, etc.

3. The real. In reality, you can find Shachris minyanim in 770 going on until almost after shkiah. Not because some chassidim use this much time to learn Chassidus, but because davening late has become a 'reality' of Chabad culture, independently of its 'imaginary' and 'symbolic' counterparts. The same goes for eating before davening (sometimes eating a quite substantial meal), etc.

Don't get me wrong: I am not saying that this is what happens to most Lubavitchers. (In fact, I don't really know what the numbers are.) I am just saying that this phenomenon (almost unique to Chabad) exists, and that's what its nature is.

Of course, it is also true that davening has become a completely different experience ('reality') in Chabad circles, both for the newcomers and the 'balabatim'. Many people would describe davening at Chabad as a richer, deeper, more vibrant experience, albeit annoying to the Jews belonging to other branches of Orthodox Judaism, whose 'imaginary' and 'symbolic' (and, as a result, 'real') expectations of davening are somewhat different.

The same analysis can be applied to many other aspects of modern Chabad 'culture', both in terms of shlichus and the 'Crown Heights' velt. I think it can also be used in a positive sense. For example: a person is stopped on the street and asked to shake lulav and esrog:

1. The imaginary: the person does the mitzva of lulav and esrog, the formal obligation he has to G-d. G-d's Will is carried out in this world.

2. The symbolic: the act of doing the mitzva connects to the essence of his neshama, revealing it (potentially). The act of doing the mitzva is important not because of its dry obligatory context, but because of what it accomplishes: the unification of G-d with this world through the act of mitzva and the subsequent creation of dira b'tachtoinim (the dwelling place of G-d in the lower worlds). I.e., the mitzva is not just a dry fulfillment of a contract, but a vehicle (a 'symbol') for the essential purpose of creation and revelation.

3. The real: it is possible that the person will become interested in Yiddishkeit and inquire about it (and, perhaps, about Chabad specifically) and this simple encounter will bring him 'back' (or, at least, closer) to frumkeit. In this, the circle of the purpose of mivtzoim is closed.


Now, let's use the same analysis in application to Modern Orthodoxy:

1. The imaginary: MO views itself as Orthodox Judaism. In fact, it does not view itself as a 'b'dieved Judaism', i.e., Judaism of a compromise. According to the MO philosophy, its path of Yiddishkeit is preferred. Torah is given to be lived, in this world. (Note that this is not the same as the Chabad concept of engaging 'der velt' in order to make dira b'tachtonim. For Chabad, 'der velt' is the goal. For MO, it's simply the status quo. When a Lubavitcher gets a job, he is being an idealist, at least as far as Chabad Chassidus is concerned. When a MO Jew gets a job, he is being a realist.)

Likewise, Torah is given to real human beings, with real desires and everyday circumstances; it was not given to the angels.

2. The symbolic: In order to accomplish the goal making Torah accessible to the modern mentality of the 'real, everyday' Jew living in the Western world in modern times, one must unite Torah with 'modernity'. Because this contemporary Jew is the one commanded with both performance of the mitzvos and learning of Torah, we must be able to interpret the meaning of the former and the content of the latter from today's, modern, perspective.

From here comes the MO view of Judaism. Mitzvos are patterns of behavior that bind us together in a Jewish community. Torah is G-d's revelation of His message of how to live a fulfilling and successful life in everyday world. The 'realism' of the mitzvos and of Torah is pushed to the shadows. It doesn't matter whether the world was created in Six Days, 5773 years ago. What matters is the message of the story to us, today. It doesn't matter whether I accomplish 'objectively' anything when I shake lulav and esrog. What matters is that that I feel and 'experience' something when I do it, that I focus on the symbolism of the act, in its historical and (constantly reinterpreted) everyday context.

3. The real: Having their significance reduced to merely symbolic context, mitzvos and Torah stop being religious phenomena and start being social ones. They are no longer an aspect of the Jew's (or the community's) relationship with G-d; they are an aspect of the Jew's relationship with other Jews and a way for him to see his own culture and self-identity on the national and international scale.

When a Chabad rabbi speaks before Musaf, he talks about avoidas Hashem and da'as Hashem. He uses some aspect of the parsha or the Yom Tov as an illustration of what our relationship with G-d must be, or how we can understand G-dliness -- G-d's revelation of Himself in the worlds, the purpose and design of His creation, etc.

When a MO rabbi speaks before Musaf, he talks about Israeli politics, using a symbolic interpretation of an aspect of the parsha (reduced almost to an anecdote). Or, perhaps, he talks about how we must approach our everyday work environment or a project: the parsha can teach us about successful interpersonal relationships or work ethic and give us peace of mind.

The interpretation of the mitzvos also suffers from the symbolic approach. Because hair covering is looked at from the symbolic point of view, not either strictly legal (as a Litvish Jew might look at it) or 'realistic' -- i.e., having a real, objective purpose outside of one's perception (a Chabad Jew's perspective), it is only important insofar as it binds a Jewish woman to a particular community of hair-covering women, or if it adds anything to her personal experience. Otherwise, it is discarded.

The same goes for many other mitzvos. The tendency of make Torah 'livable', armed with always-ready ability to assign a symbolic interpretation to a mitzva, allows one to be as meichel as one possibly can (or as Rav Moishe allows), and then perhaps some more.

In reality, therefore, MO Judaism is 'Orthodox' in name only. In practice, both its theoretical view of Judaism and its practical observance is almost closer to Conservative Judaism, from which, after all, it has evolved (as one MO rabbi said, a bit tongue-in-cheek, 'if the Hareidim build mechitza up to the ceiling, and the Conservative don't have a mechitza at all, the Modern Orthodox mechitza will be exactly half-way').


I don't know what my conclusion might be. Writing of this post was mostly self-therapeutic in nature and perhaps may be of some help to those whose encounters with MO Judaism (or Chabad, for that matter) were frustrating.

Next project: psychoanalysis of the 'yechi' culture. Just kidding!..

Livestockholm Syndrome

From Wikipedia's article:

In psychology, Stockholm Syndrome is an apparently paradoxical psychological phenomenon in which hostages express empathy and have positive feelings towards their captors, sometimes to the point of defending them. These feelings are generally considered irrational in light of the danger or risk endured by the victims, who essentially mistake a lack of abuse from their captors for an act of kindness.

Citizens of many countries suffer from Livestockholm Syndrome — a paradoxical psychological phenomenon in which citizens express empathy and have positive feelings towards the governments that have enslaved them, sometimes to the point of defending them.

These feelings are generally considered irrational by libertarians in light of the danger, risk, abuse of rights, and financial damage endured by the victims, who essentially mistake a lack of a greater abuse from their captors for an act of kindness and excuse the abuse by arguing that their captors do some good things and that without their captors, such good things would be impossible (despite contemporary and historic evidence).

Interestingly, the victims of the governments are not oblivious to the damage they incur from their captors. But they always manage to attribute the damage to other factors (e.g., too much free market — in the cases when the damage was done by too much regulation or central management), oftentimes calling for more involvement of the government, one way or another.

The syndrome is a particularly dangerous meme in that it is very contagious and self-reinforcing. Seeing other victims' livestock-like behavior reinforces a citizen's conviction that without the kind shepherd, the herd would not survive.

Three answers to the vast majority of liberal arguments

I think if there was a way to answer in one sentence to the vast majority of liberal arguments of why the government should do X or Y, this would be the best answer from constitutional point of view:


(source)

In the famous case of United States vs. Lopez, it was argued whether the government has powers, under the Interstate Commerce Clause, to make it illegal to carry concealed firearms on school campuses. The argument that the General Solicitor (the government's lawyer) presented was that carrying guns on school campuses disrupts education, which eventually has an effect on commerce of the nation. Therefore, in an effort to preserve the national commerce, the government has a power to ban guns on the campuses.

The defense lawyer argued that the Congress has to make findings explicitly linking the banned activity to the interstate commerce, not a hypothetical that might affect interstate commerce. Furthermore, he argued, it is not within jurisdiction of the Federal Government to fight crime on campuses or protect education — that remains a State's prerogative, and when the Government tries to interfere, it is crossing into the State's jurisdiction.

Justice Kennedy asked whether the Federal Government can make it illegal to throw a firebomb into a school house.

Before the lawyer had a chance to answer, Justice Scalia said the text quoted above. Sometimes the concept of the limit on the government's powers means a limit on the government's powers to do good things as well.

Or what one considers to be a good thing.

This, then, is another argument that one can throw at the liberals. The reasons why the government should not regulate people's private lives in an effort to improve the society are:

1. It is pragmatically bad, because the government is plagued by all the problems of a central planner and cannot predict (as nobody can) how to distribute resources most effectively, how to regulate without creating perverse incentives and unintended consequences, etc. In short, when the government interferes, it makes things worse. Opposite from what it was trying to do. Therefore, distribution of resources and improvement of society is best left to private entities competing on a free market. This is an economist's argument.

2. It is a violation of people's natural rights. Even if something is a good thing, you can't violate natural law, in the form of people's natural rights, to achieve this good thing. It is naturally illegal. The function of the law is not to improve society, but to resolve conflicts. When the government attempts to do the former by interfering with people's private lives, it is not only misusing the function of the law but is in fact going against it. This is a libertarian legal philosopher's argument.

3. It is unconstitutional. The people simply have not given the government such powers in the Constitution when it was written. If people wish to do so later, they can do so by ratifying an Amendment. But until that has been done, the Constitution must be interpreted according to the original intent, because the original intent shows which powers the people and the states have clearly ceded to the government.

For instance, imagine I give you a job of cleaning my house under the arrangement that you only clean in the specific places that I told you to. Then, if you want to enter room A, you have to make sure I have given you explicit instructions to do so. If "situation has changed" and, say, there was a spill that went under the door into room A, you can try to call me and obtain my permission to enter the room A. But until I have given you an explicit permission to do so, it is unlawful for you to enter my property without a permission. The same way, under the Constitution, the government has been given a limited list of enumerated powers that the individuals and the States have delegated to it. If the government tries to do something that it was not delegated to, it is infringing the States' and the individuals' rights. This is a conservative constitutionalist's approach.

This is a good video about Justice Scalia:

Does being able to vote make us free?

Very nice video.



More on the topic:

Thomas Jefferson's Nightmare 

Critique of Benign Democracy

Political spectrum, another view

I have posted before about the concept of Nolan chart, where political spectrum is represented in terms of two axes -- one representing political/social freedom and another representing economic freedom:



Today I saw this representation of the political spectrum, in terms of what services the government should be providing:


(click on the image to enlarge)

It shows that first of all, modern Conservatives and Liberals are not that different from each other, second, Ron Paul barely scratches the surface in pursuit of freedom (he is the minimally acceptable candidate), third, "voluntarism" sounds better when you're discussing your views at your (prospective) in-laws' dinner table than "anarchy" or "anarcho-capitalism".

The simple way to battle communists is with statistics. Examples of USSR and Sweden (before it went socialist vs. after, etc.). When people tell you that USSR was also totalitarian, ask them what that has to do with economics. Explain that you're talking here only about the effectiveness of the state providing services.

When battling people "below" communists (even all the way to minarchists), ask why the free markets cannot provide for all the services "below" the cut-off point (whatever it is for the individual) vs. "above". I.e., if free markets can provide food, why can't they provide education? Why not police? Why not law? (Use medieval Ireland and Jewish Law in the last 2000 years for examples of non-centralized legislature and arbitration in the hands of competing private legal authorities.)

When people quote Pirkei Avos to you, ask them, first, whether they believe that without doctors and hospitals many more people would be sick, and second, whether this means that medicine needs to be in the hands of a single centralized monopoly vs. a large number of competing service providers. Why can't the same apply to the government?

By the way, when people hear "voluntarism" and "voluntary exchange" they for some reason assume that this means no crime. I.e., if we are to have voluntary exchange of services, then we all need to be peaceful. But since we are not peaceful, we need the government to impose peace on the society.

But that argument simply states the need for protection and legislature services. Those are also services that can be provided and subscribed to voluntarily. For more information see Robert Murphy's article "But Wouldn't Warlords Take Over?"

A stretch of bad luck

(Obama, looking at the falling American economy — source)

"Throughout history, poverty is the normal condition of man. Advances which permit this norm to be exceeded — here and there, now and then — are the work of an extremely small minority, frequently despised, often condemned, and almost always opposed by all 'right-thinking people'. Whenever this tiny minority is kept from creating, or (as sometimes happens) is driven out of a society, the people then slip back into abject poverty.

This is known as 'bad luck'."
— Robert Heinlein, science fiction writer


“We had reversed the recession, avoided a depression, gotten the economy moving again. But over the last six months we’ve had a run of bad luck.”
— Barack Obama, science fiction president

[via Istapundit through arbat]

Turks vs. British looters

One of the comments to my previous post about lootings in London said:

I think your point [about self-defense] definitely has some validity to it, but I believe it's too late for that at this point for what's going on in London. If people did take to the streets today, I think it would only exacerbate an already out of control situation. [...] Violence breeds violence is an appropriate phrase here. Sure, as a preventative measure it might work really well, but it can't be encouraged once the violence has already started. I don't think that would help at all.

Here is a video of Turkish store owners from London defending themselves and their stores quite successfully from the looters, while the police drive on in their cars and do not get involved:
 

Meanwhile, the UK Prime Minister acknowledged that his police was useless and incompetent.

Former Cabinet minister Sir Malcolm Rifkind also raised concerns that officers were instructed to "stand and observe looting".

I repeat the questions I've asked in many different contexts:

1) If this were a CEO of an insurance/protection company, whose personal profits depended on how well his company does its job, would this happen?

2) If there were a few competing policing agencies, whose customers, in case of a given agency's incompetence, would switch to the other agencies (the way people switch from one cell phone company to another or switch to Apple after their PC has crashed one too many times), would this happen?

3) Would this happen in Texas?

Also, from here:

The Mumbai massacre could happen in London tomorrow; but probably it could not have happened to Londoners 100 years ago. 

In January 1909 two such anarchists, lately come from an attempt to blow up the president of France, tried to commit a robbery in north London, armed with automatic pistols. Edwardian Londoners, however, shot back – and the anarchists were pursued through the streets by a spontaneous hue-and-cry. The police, who could not find the key to their own gun cupboard, borrowed at least four pistols from passers-by, while other citizens armed with revolvers and shotguns preferred to use their weapons themselves to bring the assailants down. 

Today we are probably more shocked at the idea of so many ordinary Londoners carrying guns in the street than we are at the idea of an armed robbery. But the world of Conan Doyle’s Dr Watson, pocketing his revolver before he walked the London streets, was real. The arming of the populace guaranteed rather than disturbed the peace. 

That armed England existed within living memory; but it is now so alien to our expectations that it has become a foreign country. Our image of an armed society is conditioned instead by America: or by what we imagine we know about America. It is a skewed image, because (despite the Second Amendment) until recently in much of the US it has been illegal to bear arms outside the home or workplace; and therefore only people willing to defy the law have carried weapons. 

In the past two decades the enactment of “right to carry” legislation in the majority of states, and the issue of permits for the carrying of concealed firearms to citizens of good repute, has brought a radical change. Opponents of the right to bear arms predicted that right to carry would cause blood to flow in the streets, but the reverse has been true: violent crime in America has plummeted. 

There are exceptions: Virginia Tech, the site of the 2007 massacre of 32 people, was one local “gun-free zone” that forbade the bearing of arms even to those with a licence to carry. 

In Britain we are not yet ready to recall the final liberty of the subject listed by William Blackstone in his Commentaries on the Laws of England as underpinning all others: “The right of having and using arms for self-preservation and defence.” We would still not be ready to do so were the Mumbai massacre to happen in London tomorrow. 

“Among the many misdeeds of British rule in India,” Mahatma Gandhi said, “history will look upon the act depriving a whole nation of arms as the blackest.” The Mumbai massacre is a bitter postscript to Gandhi’s comment. D’Souza now laments his own helplessness in the face of the killers: “I only wish I had had a gun rather than a camera.”

Russian vs. American drinking and snowing habbits

Reading all the updates about people stuck in NYC because of the snow storm, gave me two thoughts:

1. I am going to start a series called “what if things were private”, in which I will give links to all the problems caused by various services and aspects of social life being “public”, i.e., run by the government (federal, state or local), and compare to what might be if these services were private (if somewhere else they are private, I will try to compare to that too).

2. The way snow descends on America (at least in my experience — i.e., this is probably limited to the East Coast, and, say, in Colorado, things are different) comparing to Russia is similar to the way Americans consume alcohol comparing to Russians.

In Russia, it snows regularly. Sometimes it snows quite heavily, but for the most part, there is a normal and regular output of snow. (The problems in Sheremetyevo Airport are actually due to “frozen rain”, not snow — but that has more to do with the first point above.) Likewise, Russians drink alcohol regularly. Some Russians, again, drink quite heavily, all the time, but most Russians drink in low to moderate amounts on a regular (daily, semi-daily, etc.) basis.

On the other hand, in America (at least, the upper East Coast), it doesn’t snow very regularly. (Which can be annoying to someone like me, who expects it to snow in winter.) But, when it does snow, it snows in an inordinate amounts — more than on average in Russia. In other words, while in Russia there is a regular low-to-moderate-to-slightly-high output of snow, America fluctuates between the periods of no snow and heavy snow storms.

Likewise, Americans don’t drink on a regular basis. What they do is go out on Friday night and get heavily drunk. Etc.

Basically, northeastern American snowing habits ruin the enjoyment that one may derive from snow. It’s nice and beautiful when it is snowing. It’s boring when it’s just cold outside (it seems like an extra-ugly version of late fall: with no beautiful leafs but with low temperature). But, nobody likes to get stuck for a day in his car in snow (like the guy whom Arbat referenced here — just click on the links by the end of the post to look at the pictures — from the looks of it, he still hasn’t reached home after having left it on Dec. 26) or even dig out one’s driveway for a few hours.

Same way, one wants to enjoy the positive benefits of alcohol without the negative ones.

(There are no lessons to draw from the second point. And yes, I am aware of all the caveats someone may point out.)

[images from etotam and e-kudinovich — click for more pictures]

P.S. One of the comments says: “Such is the nature of global warming. Very tricky it is.” (And to those who say that the global warming shows its ugly face only in summer: we’ve had a beautiful summer, with maybe two weeks of very hot weather.)

Heresy

In Middle Ages, Christian theologians postulated that heresy is even worse than heathenism. Because when someone is a heathen, he is openly a non-Christian, and thus no Christian can be confused and ensnared by him. A heretic, however, while being the enemy of the Church and its little god, pretends to be a Christian and espouses some of the doctrines of Christianity — thus, he is dangerous to an average Christian who may not be able to tell a difference between a heretic and a true believer. (And that is why the Church oppressed Jews and, lehavdil, Muslim, but burned the Christian heretics.)

Following this logic of thinking, this is the most dangerous political philosophy:

Napoleon gained support by appealing to some common concerns of French people. These included dislike of the emigrant nobility who had escaped persecution, fear by some of a restoration of the ancien régime, a dislike and suspicion of foreign countries had tried to reverse the Revolution — and a wish by Jacobins to extend France's revolutionary ideals.

Bonaparte attracted power and imperial status and gathered support for his changes of French institutions, such as the Concordat of 1801 which confirmed the Catholic Church as the majority church of France and restored some of its civil status. Napoleon by this time, however, was not a democrat, nor a republican. He was, he liked to think, an enlightened despot, the sort of man Voltaire might have found appealing. He preserved numerous social gains of the Revolution while suppressing political liberty. He admired efficiency and strength and hated feudalism, religious intolerance, and civil inequality. Enlightened despotism meant political stability. He knew his Roman history well: after 500 years of republicanism, Rome became an empire under Augustus Caesar.

Although a supporter of the radical Jacobins during the early days of the Revolution (more out of pragmatism than any real ideology), Napoleon moved to tyranny as his political career progressed and once in power embraced certain aspects of both liberalism and authoritarianism — for example, public education, a generally liberal restructuring of the French legal system, and the emancipation of the Jews — while rejecting electoral democracy and freedom of the press.

Because open and complete tyranny is obviously evil. And inefficient government is obviously disastrous. But Napoleon’s model — a strong government that provides for most civil liberties, a government that is oppressive but only for the purpose of being “efficient” and resolute — may sound attractive to some. It takes greater intelligence and more time to recognize the problem with this system.

Just like I was an atheist before I became a frum Jew, I was a supporter of a strong centralized government that provided for civil freedoms — a “Conservative” in American terms — before I became a libertarian.

(Alter Rebbe, by the way, also recognized the danger of the attractive lure of Napoleon’s promises of emancipation of the Jews. Better to be confronted by a clear enemy such as the oppresive Russian Tzar who sponsored pogroms than by a hidden one like Napoleon who would give civil freedom with his right hand and assimilation with his left one. Thus, during the Napoleonic invasion of Russia, Alter Rebbe opposed Napoleon.)

Of Nazis and airports

If terrorists learn that elderly white women from Iowa are exempt from screening, that’s exactly whom they will recruit.

— New York Times

Three links.

About a mother.

About a daughter. (All friends of political correctness and “equality”? That child was groped by a stranger thanks to you.)

But it’s all for our safety, aint’t it? Sure...

arbat says: what the airport searches are about is not security (watch the third videos). It’s about fascist show-offs. We have to show to the public that we care about its safety. Flirt with the masses, to borrow an expression from The Big Soviet Encyclopedia. So, we do it in a rough, brutal way, with zero quality.

And people wonder why I am a libertarian.

Libertarianism and Torah

What is Torah’s position on anarchy, lack of a single compulsory political power in a given society? From Defending the Human Spirit: Jewish Law’s Vision for a Moral Society by Rabbi Dr. Warren Goldstein, the chief rabbi of South Africa:

Jewish law’s attachment to freedom is also manifest in its struggles with the concept of any political power. A king, by definition, limits his subjects’ freedom. The following Midrashic passage discusses the appointment of a king mentioned in the Book of Deutoronomy:

The Holy one Blessed is He said to Israel: “My children, I had intended that you be free from kingship … like a wild donkey in the desert that has no fear of man on it, so had I imagined that you should not have the fear of kingship on you…. But you did not want that.”

The passage reveals that the ideal is the untrammeled freedom of the wild donkey in the desert that answers to no man. It does not distinguish between a good king and a tyrannical one, which implies that a king, by definition, imposes limits on the freedom of his subjects. 

Jewish law has always been wary of political power and has therefore sought ways of controlling rather than enabling it. Thus, even though the Bible makes provision for the appointment of a king, no king was appointed for hundreds of years after the conquest of the Land of Israel. When eventually the people requested of the prophet Samuel to appoint a king, they were met with opposition both from Samuel and from G–d Himself:

All the elders of Israel then gathered together and came to Samuel, to Ramah. They said to gim: “Behold, you are old and your sons did not follow your ways. So now appoint for us a king to judge us, like all the nations.” It was wrong in Samuel’s eyes that they said: “Give us a king to judge us”, and Samuel prayed to G–d. G–d said to Samuel: “Listen to the voice of the people in all that they say to you, for it is not you whom they have rejected, but it Me Whom they have rejected from reigning over them. Like all their deed that they have done from the day I brought them up from Egypt until this day — they forsook Me and worshipped the gods of others.”

Many Biblical commentators and Jewish law experts have debated, from Talmudic times, the seeming inconsistency between the command in Deuteronomy: “You shall surely set over yourself a king” and the grudging acquiescence given by G–d to the people’s request in the Book of Samuel. And yet, whatever explanation is given, the apparent contradiction reflects the fact that the political authority of a king presents problems for and creates tension within Jewish law. This tension means that Jewish law is naturally drawn to a constitutionalist model of emphasizing the limitations of state power, rather than exercise of it. Because it is uncomfortable with the authority of a king, the Jewish law seeks ways to limit his power.

Even the command to appoint the king given in Deuteronomy is far from uncontroversial. It is phrased in what is for the Bible is a relatively unconventional style in that it makes the appointment of a king dependent on the people’s declaration: “When you come to the land… and you will say, ‘I will set a king over myself.’” Biblical commandment are usually just that — commandments — and do not depend on the support of the people for their validity. Furthermore, the Bible, in uncharacteristic fashion, seems to be motivating the appointment of a king by referring to the practices of “all the nations”. The strange phraseology leads Rabbi Nehorai, one of the scholars (Amora’im) mentioned in the Talmud to conclude that the appointment of a king is not mandatory but rather dependent on the wishes of the people. It is a concession to the people’s weekend of needing a political figure “like all the nations”.

Update: for Chassidic approach to the mitzva of choosing a king, see Tzemach Tzedek’s Derech Mitzvosecho, “Mitzvas Minui Melech” (it’s one of the chapters translated in the Sichot in English edition). It explains why — from the spiritual perspective — Shmuel haNovi did not want Jews to have a king, and what the advantage of Melech HaMoshiach will be over the previous kings.

Crook vs. racist?

Back in the day, there was an election in Louisiana between two candidates for a governor (or a senator, I am not sure and am too lazy to look up). Much of the intelligentsia supported one of the candidates. The slogan of the intelligentsia was: “Better a crook than a racist” (this just shows you the realities of politics in Louisiana; as well as the realities of any politics, for that matter).

I was just thinking while reading this (I don’t know anything about this blog; it’s just the first source of that speech I found while googling) that I suppose people voting for the current president did not think in the same terms (not that McCain was a crook; I mean whatever flaw people who voted for Obama found in McCain was obviously worse that the flaws of Obama). I actually know a 22-year-old who was quite proud of the fact that her first act of political activism (nothing to be proud of ever, but never mind that) was to vote for Obama. I think it’s quite sad, to be honest.

 Like Obama, I am a graduate of Harvard Law School. I too have Muslims in my family. I am black, and I was once a leftist Democrat. Since our backgrounds are somewhat similar, I perceive something in Obama's policy toward Israel which people without that background may not see. All my life I have witnessed a strain of anti-Semitism in the black community. It has been fueled by the rise of the Nation of Islam and Louis Farrakhan, but it predates that organization.

We heard it in Jesse Jackson's "HYMIE town" remark years ago during his presidential campaign. We heard it most recently in Jeremiah Wright's remark about "them Jews" not allowing Obama to speak with him. I hear it from my own Muslim family members who see the problem in the Middle East as a "Jew" problem.

Growing up in a small, predominantly black urban community in Pennsylvania, I heard the comments about Jewish shop owners. They were "greedy cheaters" who could not be trusted, according to my family and others in the neighborhood. I was too young to understand what it means to be Jewish, or know that I was hearing anti-Semitism. These people seemed nice enough to me, but others said they were "evil". Sadly, this bigotry has yet to be eradicated from the black community.

In Chicago, the anti-Jewish sentiment among black people is even more pronounced because of the direct influence of Farrakhan and the Nation of Islam. Most African Americans are not followers of "The Nation", but many have a quiet respect for its leader because, they say, "he speaks the truth" and "stands up for the black man". What they mean of course is that he viciously attacks the perceived "enemies" of the black community – white people and Jews. Even some self-described Christians buy into his demagoguery.

The question is whether Obama, given his Muslim roots and experience in Farrakhan's Chicago, shares this antipathy for Israel and Jewish people. Is there any evidence that he does. First, the President was taught for twenty years by a virulent anti-Semite, the Reverend Jeremiah Wright. In the black community it is called "sitting under". You don't merely attend a church, you "sit under" a Pastor to be taught and mentored by him. Obama "sat under" Wright for a very long time. He was comfortable enough with Farrakhan – Wright's friend – to attend and help organize his "Million Man March". I was on C-Span the morning of the march arguing that we must never legitimize a racist and anti-Semite, no matter what "good" he claims to be doing. Yet a future President was in the crowd giving Farrakhan his enthusiastic support. [read on] 

But — hooray for the free dental insurance. (Well, I personally don’t have it, but I am happy for those that do.)

Also, this caught my attention: “Growing up in a small, predominantly black urban community in Pennsylvania, I heard the comments about Jewish shop owners. They were ‘greedy cheaters’ who could not be trusted, according to my family and others in the neighborhood.”

But, which shop owners (or worse yet, factory owners, CEOs, etc.) are not “greedy cheaters who cannot be trusted”? You hear from many very intelligent, educated people with good character traits that they “don’t like capitalism”. Of course, they like being able to buy bananas while living in a northern state more than once a year. And pizza (which may be made locally, but most of the things to make it, including the ingredients and the tools, were brought from other states by those huge trucks or even from overseas). And they like to be able to afford to make use of air (or bus, or taxi) travel. And of the 99% of their life that would be impossible without capitalism. And yet, the people who provide them with the goods and services are not to be trusted and the system of free exchange of goods and services is bad.

Also, recently I heard from a family member that “there shouldn’t be business-type relations within a family”. I asked her: “Do you mean that if I own a business — or, let’s make it less evil, a lab — and your husband is a specialist, and I need exactly that kind of specialist, it is bad for me to hire him and allow him to provide for his family, while I get in return his service?” She said: “Well, no, of course not. I mean relations of a simpler lomd”. So, I said: “You mean, if I need a babysitter for my kids, and my niece is looking for a summer job, it’s better for me to hire a complete stranger, and my niece to go working for complete strangers than for us to help each other out with what each one is looking for?” She didn’t think that was too evil either. Whatever example I was providing was not evil. In the end, it seemed, some kind of business-like relations in a family are fine. As long as children don’t “borrow” two dollars from their parents and then demand those back. Well, yeah, that’s just a bit stupid.

A note

(“If you use your free insurance, your teeth will look as shiny as mine”)

A note found in President Obama’s desk from his predecessor.

To: President Obama
From: President Bush
Subject: When [...] hits the fan

Dear Borya,

When things get tough, do the following:

1. Blame everything on me.
2. Do everything exactly like me.

Best of luck,
Garik

It seems our mighty leader has gotten to step two. (If you remember, President Bush started a war in Iraq. The war was going badly. Liberals and the press were screaming. Then the President found a proper general, who won the war. The same story, by the way, happened with President Lincoln.)

[via arbat]

Medieval Ireland: an example of a libertarian legal system

If you’re lucky to be Irish, you’re lucky enough.

— An Irish proverb

A question is often asked: in an anarcho-libertarian society, how would the courts and legislation function? Murray Rothbard addresses this and many other questions in his book, For a New Liberty. But here I will only quote an example of the libertarianism in Irish society that he provides. It is very interesting to me from both political and historical point of view, as well as because I like Irish culture, music, language (I was a member of Gaelic club in college) and history.

* * *

The most remarkable historical example of a society of libertarian law and courts, however, has been neglected by historians until very recently. And this was also a society where not only the courts and the law were largely libertarian, but where they operated within a purely state-less and libertarian society. This was ancient Ireland — an Ireland which persisted in this libertarian path for roughly a thousand years until its brutal conquest by England in the seventeenth century. And, in contrast to many similarly functioning primitive tribes (such as the Ibos in West Africa, and many European tribes), preconquest Ireland was not in any sense a "primitive" society: it was a highly complex society that was, for centuries, the most advanced, most scholarly, and most civilized in all of Western Europe.
        For a thousand years, then, ancient Celtic Ireland had no State or anything like it. As the leading authority on ancient Irish law has written: "There was no legislature, no bailiffs, no police, no public enforcement of justice . . . . There was no trace of State-administered justice."⁹
        How then was justice secured? The basic political unit of ancient Ireland was the tuath. All "freemen" who owned land, all professionals, and all craftsmen, were entitled to become members of a tuath. Each tuath's members formed an annual assembly which decided all common policies, declared war or peace on other tuatha, and elected or deposed their "kings." An important point is that, in contrast to primitive tribes, no one was stuck or bound to a given tuath, either because of kinship or of geographical location. Individual members were free to, and often did, secede from a tuath and join a competing tuath. Often, two or more tuatha decided to merge into a single, more efficient unit. As Professor Peden states, "the tuath is thus a body of persons voluntarily united for socially beneficial purposes and the sum total of the landed properties of its members constituted its territorial dimension."¹⁰ In short, they did not have the modern State with its claim to sovereignty over a given (usually expanding) territorial area, divorced from the landed property rights of its subjects; on the contrary, tuatha were voluntary associations [p. 232] which only comprised the landed properties of its voluntary members. Historically, about 80 to 100 tuatha coexisted at any time throughout Ireland.
        But what of the elected "king"? Did he constitute a form of State ruler? Chiefly, the king functioned as a religions high priest, presiding over the worship rites of the tuath, which functioned as a voluntary religious, as well as a social and political, organization. As in pagan, pre-Christian, priesthoods, the kingly function was hereditary, this practice carrying over to Christian times. The king was elected by the tuath from within a royal kin-group (the derbfine), which carried the hereditary priestly function. Politically, however, the king had strictly limited functions: he was the military leader of the tuath, and he presided over the tuath assemblies. But he could only conduct war or peace negotiations as agent of the assemblies; and he was in no sense sovereign and had no rights of administering justice over tuath members. He could not legislate, and when he himself was party to a lawsuit, he had to submit his case to an independent judicial arbiter.
        Again, how, then, was law developed and justice maintained? In the first place, the law itself was based on a body of ancient and immemorial custom, passed down as oral and then written tradition through a class of professional jurists called the brehons. The brehons were in no sense public, or governmental, officials; they were simply selected by parties to disputes on the basis of their reputations for wisdom, knowledge of the customary law, and the integrity of their decisions. As Professor Peden states:

. . . the professional jurists were consulted by parties to disputes for advice as to what the law was in particular cases, and these same men often acted as arbitrators between suitors. They remained at all times private persons, not public officials; their functioning depended upon their knowledge of the law and the integrity of their judicial reputations.¹¹

Furthermore, the brehons had no connection whatsoever with the individual tuatha or with their kings. They were completely private, national in scope, and were used by disputants throughout Ireland. Moreover, and this is a vital point, in contrast to the system of private Roman lawyers, the brehon was all there was; there were no other judges, no "public" judges of any kind, in ancient Ireland.
         It was the brehons who were schooled in the law, and who added glosses and applications to the law to fit changing conditions. Furthermore, [p. 233] there was no monopoly, in any sense, of the brehon jurists; instead, several competing schools of jurisprudence existed and competed for the custom of the Irish people.
How were the decisions of the brehons enforced? Through an elaborate, voluntarily developed system of "insurance," or sureties. Men were linked together by a variety of surety relationships by which they guaranteed one another for the righting of wrongs, and for the enforcement of justice and the decisions of the brehons. In short, the brehons themselves were not involved in the enforcement of decisions, which rested again with private individuals linked through sureties. There were various types of surety. For example, the surety would guarantee with his own property the payment of a debt, and then join the plaintiff in enforcing a debt judgment if the debtor refused to pay. In that case, the debtor would have to pay double damages: one to the original creditor, and another as compensation to his surety.
        And this system applied to all offences, aggressions and assaults as well as commercial contracts; in short, it applied to all cases of what we would call "civil" and "criminal" law. All criminals were considered to be "debtors" who owed restitution and compensation to their victims, who thus became their "creditors." The victim would gather his sureties around him and proceed to apprehend the criminal or to proclaim his suit publicly and demand that the defendant submit to adjudication of their dispute with the brehons. The criminal might then send his own sureties to negotiate a settlement or agree to submit the dispute to the brehons. If he did not do so, he was considered an "outlaw" by the entire community; he could no longer enforce any claim of his own in the courts, and he was treated to the opprobrium of the entire community.¹²
        There were occasional "wars," to be sure, in the thousand years of Celtic Ireland, but they were minor brawls, negligible compared to the devastating wars that racked the rest of Europe. As Professor Peden points out, "without the coercive apparatus of the State which can through taxation and conscription mobilize large amounts of arms and manpower, the Irish were unable to sustain any large scale military force in the field for any length of time. Irish wars . . . were pitiful brawls and cattle raids by European standards."¹³ [p. 234]

        Thus, we have indicated that it is perfectly possible, in theory and historically, to have efficient and courteous police, competent and learned judges, and a body of systematic and socially accepted law — and none of these things being furnished by a coercive government. Government — claiming a compulsory monopoly of protection over a geographical area, and extracting its revenues by force — can be separated from the entire field of protection. Government is no more necessary for providing vital protection service than it is necessary for providing anything else. And we have not stressed a crucial fact about government: that its compulsory monopoly over the weapons of coercion has led it, over the centuries, to infinitely more butcheries and infinitely greater tyranny and oppression than any decentralized, private agencies could possibly have done. If we look at the black record of mass murder, exploitation, and tyranny levied on society by governments over the ages, we need not be loath to abandon the Leviathan State and . . . try freedom.

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Liberals, Tories and liberty

From the preface (by Albert Jay Nock) to Herbert Spencer’s The Man Versus the State:

Spencer ends The New Toryism with a prediction which American readers today will find most interesting, if they bear in mind that it was written [ninety five] years ago in England and primarily for English readers. He says:

The laws made by Liberals are so greatly increasing the compulsions and restraints exercised over citizens, that among Conservatives who suffer from this aggressiveness there is growing up a tendency to resist it. Proof is furnished by the fact that the “Liberty and Property Defense League”, largely consisting of Conservatives, has taken for its motto “Individualism versus Socialism”. So that if the present drift of things continues, it may by-and-by really happen that the Tories will be defenders of liberties which the Liberals, in pursuit of what they think popular welfare, trample under foot.

This prophecy has already been fulfilled in the United States.

And earlier:

Spencer shows that the early Liberal was consistently for cutting down the State's coercive power over the citizen, wherever this was possible. He was for reducing to a minimum the number of points at which the State might make coercive interventions upon the individual. He was for steadily enlarging the margin of existence within which the citizen might pursue and regulate his own activities as he saw fit, free of State control or State supervision. Liberal policies and measures, as originally conceived, were such as reflected these aims. The Tory, on the other hand, was opposed to these aims, and his policies reflected this opposition.
        In general terms, the Liberal was consistently inclined towards the individualist philosophy of society, while the Tory was consistently inclined towards the Statist philosophy.
        Spencer shows moreover that as a matter of practical policy, the early Liberal proceeded towards the realization of his aims by the method of repeal. He was not for making new laws, but for repealing old ones. It is most important to remember this. Wherever the Liberal saw a law which enhanced the State's coercive power over the citizen, he was for repealing it and leaving its place blank. There were many such laws on the British statute-books, and when Liberalism came into power it repealed an immense grist of them.
        Spencer must be left to describe in his own words, as he does in the course of this essay, how in the latter half of the [19th] century British Liberalism went over bodily to the philosophy of Statism, and abjuring the political method of repealing existent coercive measures, proceeded to outdo the Tories in constructing new coercive measures of ever-increasing particularity.
        This piece of British political history has great value for American readers, because it enables them to see how closely American Liberalism has followed the same course. It enables them to interpret correctly the significance of Liberalism's influence upon the direction of our public life in the last half-century, and to perceive just what it is to which that influence has led, just what the consequences are which that influence has tended to bring about, and just what are the further consequences which may be expected to ensue.

Now, the bit about repealing earlier-existing laws vs. creating new laws is interesting to me. In the earlier post called “Evolution of Liberal Reform”, I earlier quoted Arbat (translated from Russian):

All starts with the leftists finding a “Problem”. Oftentimes the Problem is not really a problem. For instance they think that asset inequality is a problem. Even though it is the main stimulus for the economy’s development. To call it a problem is similar to calling voltage difference in the electric grid a problem that needs to be corrected as soon as possible, so that there is no difference in electric potentials at all. [For those less physically inclined, replace electric grid with a ski resort and the voltage difference with the height difference between the top and the bottom of the hill.]

Having identified the Problem, leftists propose a Plan. Oftentimes the Plan involves people giving up some kind of freedom and the government, in turn, forbidding the Problem away. As a rule, the freedom is indeed taken away. It’s the only part that goes according to the Plan. The original “Problem” remains the same, but in addition to it arise a number of “unforeseen side effects”. Which are of course presented as the next set of “Problems”, which are treated with new Plans (instead of getting rid of the original plan, which caused the problems in the first place), and so on.

What is really wrong with socialism?

In his famous two essays on the anarchist model of law and defense, Robert Murphy gives a good summary of libertarian critique of socialism while also explaining not just the advantage but the necessity of capitalism:

* * *

The traditional opponents of socialism argued that it had insufficient incentives for the average worker; without tying pay to performance, people would shirk and output would be far lower than in a capitalist economy. Only if a new “Socialist Man” evolved, who enjoyed working for his comrades as much as for himself, could a socialist system succeed.
     Although valid, this criticism misses the essence of the problem. It took Ludwig von Mises to explain, in a 1920 paper, the true flaw with socialism: Without market prices for the means of production, government planners cannot engage in economic calculation, and so literally have no idea if they are using society’s resources efficiently. Consequently, socialism suffers not only from a problem of incentives, but also from a problem of knowledge. To match the performance of a market economy, socialist planners would not need to be merely angels, committed to the commonweal—they would also need to be gods, capable of superhuman calculations.
     At any time, there is only a limited supply of labor, raw materials, and capital resources that can be combined in various ways to create output goods. A primary function of an economic system is to determine which goods should be produced, in what quantities and in what manner, from these limited resources. The market economy solves this problem through the institution of private property, which implies free enterprise and freely floating prices.
     The owners of labor, capital, and natural resources—the “means of production”—are free to sell their property to the highest bidder. The entrepreneurs are free to produce and sell whatever goods they wish. The ultimate test of profit and loss imposes order on this seeming chaos: If a producer consistently spends more on his inputs than he earns from selling his output, he will go bankrupt and no longer have any influence on the manner in which society’s resources are used.
     On the other hand, the successful producer creates value for consumers, by purchasing resources at a certain price and transforming them into goods that fetch a higher price. In the market economy, such behavior is rewarded with profits, which allow the producer in question to have a greater say in the use of society’s scarce resources.

None of this is true in the socialist state. Even if they truly intended the happiness of their subjects, the government planners would squander the resources at their disposal. With no test of profit and loss, the planners would have no feedback and would thus be operating in the dark. A decision to produce more shoes and fewer shirts, or vice versa, would be largely arbitrary. Furthermore, the individuals to ultimately decide the fate of society’s resources would be selected through the political process, not through the meritocracy of the market. [Ad kan.]

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Sometimes people blame the failure of socialism in Russia on the dictators. But what did the violation of human rights have to do with the economy (besides the fact that they had to force people into socialism, just like today in the US people are forced into being taxed, so that US auto industry can be bailed out)? Killing off the intelligentsia did not cause the great famines of 1920’s and 30’s. Collectivization of the farms did. Suppressing freedom of speech was terrible, but it wasn’t the reason why the Soviet Union had to import grain from Canada after the Virgin Lands disaster (and other similar campaigns).

One adviser to Khrushchev was Trofim Lysenko, who promised greatly increased production with minimal investment. Such schemes were attractive to Khrushchev, who ordered them implemented. Lysenko managed to maintain his influence under Khrushchev despite repeated failures; as each proposal failed, he advocated another. Lysenko's influence greatly retarded the development of genetic science in the Soviet Union. In 1959, Khrushchev announced a goal of overtaking the United States in production of milk, meat, and butter. Local officials, with Khrushchev's encouragement, made unrealistic pledges of production. These goals were met by forcing farmers to slaughter their breeding herds and by purchasing meat at state stores, then reselling it back to the government, artificially increasing recorded production.

In June 1962, food prices were raised, particularly on meat and butter (by 25-30%). This caused public discontent. In the southern Russian city of Novocherkassk (Rostov Region) this discontent escalated to a strike and a revolt against the authorities. The revolt was put down by the military who opened fire on unarmed demonstrators. According to Soviet official accounts, 22 people were killed and 87 wounded. In addition, 116 demonstrators were convicted of involvement and seven of them executed. Information about the revolt and the massacre was completely suppressed in the USSR, but spread through Samizdat and damaged Khrushchev's reputation in the West.

Drought struck the Soviet Union in 1963; the harvest of 107,500,000 short tons (97,500,000 t) of grain was down from a peak of 134,700,000 short tons (122,200,000 t) in 1958. The shortages resulted in bread lines, a fact at first kept from Khrushchev. Reluctant to purchase food in the West, but faced with the alternative of widespread hunger, Khrushchev exhausted the nation's hard currency reserves and expended part of its gold stockpile in the purchase of grain and other foodstuffs.