The picture above (source; courtesy of e) reminded me of a statement by the Rogatchover Gaon: “People say there are seventy faces in Torah. But I see ten faces. And if I was smarter, I would see only one face.” Meaning, the smarter and the more erudite in Torah (not to mention the holier) one is, the more one sees Torah not as a bunch of details, but as a small number of klalim (principles, main ideas).
I thought recently while studying Gemara with my chavrusa that this goal is important to keep in mind not just for the whole Torah but even for a small sugya.
(Also, check out “How the Rebbe saw Torah” to hear how one talmid chochom who would come to discuss nigleh with the Rebbe said that the Rebbe is like Rambam.)
On the other hand, I remember a statement by my local rabbi that if there is an inherent danger in studying deep sugyas of Chassidus, then it is in focusing on the “grand scheme” and losing sight of the everyday, simple things. Like thinking how by giving tzedaka one creates giluim in Atzilus, or achdus of Soveiv and Memalei, or Dira b’tachtoinim, but not thinking about the fact that you are simply helping another Jew.
I know, the immediate answer from most people is: well, the two are connected. Can’t have one without the other. And so on. And, yes, that is how it is supposed to be, but my point is: it is easy to loose sight of this.
There is a famous story with Alter Rebbe and Mitteler Rebbe. The latter’s little son once fell out of his crib and was crying. Mitteler Rebbe, who was sitting nearby, was so engrossed in his learning that he didn’t realize that his son was crying. Alter Rebbe came in from another room, picked up the child and calmed him. Then he told Mitteler Rebbe that “however deeply one is absorbed in study, prayer, or the performance of mitzvos, one must always have an ear open to the cries of a Jewish child”.
There is a similar story of Alter Rebbe being a chazan on Yom Kippur. In the middle of Neila, the holiest prayer of the day, when the essence of one’s soul becomes truly united with the Essence of G-d, he stopped, took off his talles and left the shull. On the outskirts of the town a woman had given birth to a child. Alter Rebbe chopped some wood, lit up fire and cooked a soup for the woman.
(I was thinking of finding a picture appropriate to the topic of machloikes, but then thought that nothing would fit better than this video, which I like very much.)
As I was reading the discussion, I thought this (not necessarily regarding any side of the discussion):
It seems to me that sometimes our American sensitivity and tendency to make peace and accommodate everyone’s opinion (commendable though this tendency may be) gets in a way of understanding the machloikes. Back in the day, people didn’t have a problem saying “I disagree.” Not “I am right on some level, you are right on another level”, but “I am right, and you are wrong.” Doesn’t mean they didn’t respect the other side’s opinion (depending on the nature of machloikes, of course), but they still thought it to be wrong.
* * *
[Beginning of a long digression — feel free to skip to the next asterisks]
There is a second level of justification — from spiritual perspective. Obviously, in Judaism we have the statement that “eilu v’eilu dvorim Elokim chayim” (“these and these are words of the living G-d” — regarding the dispute between Shammai and Hillel, but more abstractly regarding most other disputes). What is sometimes overlooked, as my rabbi once told me, is that Shammai and Hillel themselves still believed the other party to be wrong. More importantly (for us), we follow only one of their specific opinions for Halacha purposes. And in many cases when we say that a certain halachic opinion is for this community, while other opinion is for another, it’s only due to the circumstances of us being in golus, as Rambam explains in the introduction to Mishnei Torah.
On the other hand, in many cases, of course, this is not true. We accommodate for multiple opinions in our psak din, and indeed, this is the beauty of Torah both from spiritual/metaphysical and sociological point of view (I can hear teeth grinding). From the latter perspective, says Reb Shlomo Yaffe, accommodation of multiple opinions in the final ruling (since all of them are right, despite sometimes obvious disagreement and even mutual exclusivity), the “bottom line” of Jewish law tends towards the middle. On the other hand, in case of, lehavdil, X-ity and Islam, with passage of time these religions acted like a centrifuge, pushing their choices of the ultimate interpretation of their texts towards the outside, the extreme.
Of course, we, as religious Jews, don’t care so much about sociology (this was just an interesting point explaining the difference between Abrahamic religions — the principle of “eilu v’eilu” vs. “my way or the highway”). From philosophical point of view, the principle of “eilu v’eilu” becomes interesting, because it reveals fully the unlimited and undefined nature of G-dliness, from which Torah stems.
I had a conversation once with an apikoires, who asked me if G-d can create a square circle (a more intelligent way to put the question with the stone). I told him that according to the school of chakirah, He cannot — but it’s a limitation not on G-d, but on our reality, or, as Rabbi Gottlieb put it, one our language (i.e., our logic). “When you say square circle, I hear words, but no meaning enters my mind. So, you’re asking me, can G-d create _____, and there is nothing in the blank. You did not ask any question.” Or, to put it differently, G-d could create a square circle, but it would be incompatible with our reality (it’s a slightly different statement from Rabbi Gottlieb’s, but I’ll just lump them in one category for now).
On the other hand, I said, the school of mysticism teaches that G-d indeed can create a square circle and even make it compatible with our reality. In fact, in our history, such things have happened (if you are lazy to read the whole post, in the case of Menoira oil both burning and not burning at the same time, or in the case of Aron Koidesh not taking any space). Now, how the square circle would look to us is a different story. Perhaps it would look like a hologram or, more simply, like a Necker cube, only not on the level of illusion or perceptual ambiguity, but in reality.
“This is interesting,” the apikoires said. “But this means that G-d could tell you to do X and not to do X at the same time. What would you do then?” He thought he had me, but he made a trap for himself. In fact, I explained, every law that G-d gave us is like this. Torah derives from G-dliness, which is multidimensional (infinitely-dimensional, even, one might say). It is the job of our authorities, then, to bring down a specific dimension of each law to this world — and this is where the disagreement stems from, when one authority’s spiritual level is different from that of the other, and as a result, they disagree on the practical “interpretation” of the law, since the particular dimension of the law that one brings down is different from that of another authority.
In practice, sometimes we rule in favor of one opinion, and sometimes the other (because only one opinion may be appropriate for this world, for this particular place and this particular time), but sometimes we accommodate for multiple opinions. An example I gave is that of dipping chalah in soup on Shabbos. On Shabbos, a Jew is not allowed to cook. Skipping many details, this means he is not allowed to put something defined legally as uncooked into a hot soup still in the first or second vessel of cooking. What about challah? Is baking the same as cooking? If it is, then he is allowed to dip challah in that soup (since something already cooked cannot be further cooked). If it’s not, then he is not allowed to dip challah in the soup (since that would be tantamount to cooking the challah). There is a disagreement in opinions.
We rule that lehatchilo one should not dip challah in the soup, but b’diyavad, if someone already dipped the challah (e.g., having not paid attention), one is allowed to eat it. Thus, in our ruling we accommodate for both opinions, despite the fact that they are opposite and mutually exclusive.
Furthermore, from mystical perspective, we learn that even those opinions that were presented in Gemara and were clearly rejected as unsupported by our tradition, are still true on some spiritual level. In fact, they are even higher (from the point of view of gilui) than the opinions that were accepted — and this is why they were rejected, being incompatible with this lowly world (of course, b’etzem, the accepted opinions are higher, since they allow for dira b’tachtoinim). See this beautiful chapter (“Co-existence of Contradictory Truths”) from the Gutnick edition of Rambam’s 9th and 10th principles (with commentaries ranging from classical to those of the Lubavitcher Rebbe) for further discussion on the topic of the spiritual origin of different opinions and the reasons for their inclusion in Gemara (even those that were rejected).
[End of the long digression]
* * *
I think despite all of the above, however, we still overlook the other, non-accomodating side of the machloikes. Yes, sometimes we rule in favor of both parties. And sometimes we say that this is right for us, and this is right for them. But sometimes we rule in favor of only one opinion! Sometimes we say that only one opinion is more appropriate for everyone.
Or, more specifically, sometimes we follow a particular shitta, and even though we recognize the other shitta as beautiful, and part of Torah, and “words of the living G-d”, and shining brightly on some high spiritual level — but here, in this world, where we are trying to bring Mashiach, this shitta is less appropriate than the one we accept. Of course, people who hold according to that shitta may think the same about ours. And we think they are wrong in practice (or at least less right than we are), and they think we are wrong. And guess what? There is nothing wrong with thinking someone is wrong. There is not always a need to sweeten the pill.
In Chassidus exists the famous dichotomy of Etzem ve’Gilui, Essence and Revelation: that which is essential cannot be revealed and vice versa, that which is a revelation cannot be the essence. The definition of G-d’s Essence, as Rabbi Paltiel puts it, is that which is revealed by G-d to G-d Himself only.
When speaking to a person, we hear his voice, see his hand movements and face expression — but surely these things are only expressions of his thoughts and desires. Even the latter are not the essential aspect of the person himself. The essence of a person is never revealed — and had it been revealed, one would be unable to distinguish individual thoughts and desires coming out of it.
[The vessels] reveal the light and they also conceal and veil the light. The light which they reveal is the light which is on the level of the worlds; i.e., the vessels of the world of Atzilus shine forth and reveal light in the world of Atzilus. And through the medium of the parsa which divides between Atzilus and Beriah, they reveal the light within the world of Beriah; and from Beriah, [the light descends] to Yetzirah.
This is not, however, a revelation of the light as it exists in its own right. For, as explained above, the light is representative of the source of light and is truly simple and infinite in nature. Thus, in essence, the light is not on the level of the worlds; for [by definition,] a world must exist as a separate and limited individual entity. [...]
Since limitation and infinity are by definition different, [G-d’s infinite] light is not at all on the level of these [finite] worlds. Thus we can appreciate that the light which the vessels reveal in the worlds is not the essence of the light, but rather an external ray of the light. Indeed, the essence of the light remains hidden within them, concealed by them. And it is through concealing the essence of the light that they are able to reveal the external dimensions of the light and cause it to effect change in the world.
Thus both concepts are true; [the vessels] conceal the essence of the light and reveal its external dimensions. These two concepts are interrelated; it is because they conceal the essence of the light, that they are able to reveal its external dimensions. [...]
This leads to a general principle of greater scope: A revelation of the essence brings about concealment for others. [For they are not on the same level as the essence, and hence, cannot perceive it.] Conversely, a concealment of the essence brings about revelation for others. [For when the essential light is hidden, the aspects which the others can perceive are revealed.]
From this, we can understand how, in the spiritual realms, the vessels of Atzilus conceal the essence of the light and reveal only its external dimensions. And indeed, it is because they conceal the inner, essential light, that they are able to reveal the external dimensions of the light and thus perform [various] functions as explained within the context of the analogy to the soul.
This is why G-d’s Essence cannot exists in the Upper Worlds, the worlds of revelation. Had it been revealed there, it would destroy them. At the same time, the Essence is able to exist in this world, a world of concealment, precisely because it is such.
* * *
In the ma’amor Inyana shel Toras HaChassidus (known in English translation as On the Essence of Chassidus), the Rebbe brings the new concept: the Essence could be revealed, and in such a way as not to negate the existence of the worlds in which it is revealed. The worlds will remain the worlds, and the Essence will still be revealed.
The Rebbe uses the analogy of Yechida, the essence of the soul — as opposed to nefesh, ruach, neshama, and chaya, the four particular levels of the soul. In the Rebbe’s words (I am quoting the Chassidic Heritage Series translation — although, I must say, the original Loshon Koidesh expresses the idea much more clearly):
Though Yechidah is an essence-state, it does not negate NaRaNaCh; on the contrary, Yechidah is the essence of each of these particular levels.
That itself is one of the differences between the terms “manifestation” (gilui) and “essence” (etzem): “Manifestation” is particular, and therefore, whatever does not correspond to its own specific form of revelation is not “it”. Since it is an outwards revelation, “extension”, it negates that which is not consonant with itself.
Etzem, in contrast, is the essence-state of any given subject. [And thus does not negate the particulars if revealed “simultaneously” with them.]
Therefore, [because essence underlies all the particular forms that are manifest,] one of the fundamental emphases of Chassidus is the manner in which all of the individual particulars are united with the essence. [...]
In relation ot the subject of the sefirot, [...] Chassidus emphasizes the way in which the attribute of Malchus is united with the attribute of Yesoid [during recitation of Moideh Ani], until they become one thing — “Living and Eternal King”.
Hence, the idea of Oneness expressed in “There is nothing else besides Him” (Ein od milvado) does not negate the existence of the worlds, but means, rather, that even the worlds themselves are found within the limitations of their existences (and subject to the bounds of space and time) are still united in a perfect and complete unity with the Essence of the Light of the Ein Sof.
The Rebbe goes on to explain how the concept of unity regarding recitation of Moideh Ani is found and revealed in other areas of Pardes by Chassidus.
This is one explanation of how Chassidus is the Essence of Torah. Torah consists of four levels: pshat, remez, drush and soid. From simple to mystical. A question asked by Rashi on a simple level is not the question asked on the homiletical level of remez and is not the question asked on the level of soid. Just the same as in the soul, powers existing on the level of nefesh are not the powers existing on the level of chaya. The levels are incompatible, and cannot be revealed one within another.
Just, however, as Yechida, the essence of the soul is close to all four levels at the same time, or like the Essence of G-d’s Light is close to all four worlds at the same time, the essence of Torah, Chassidus, is close to all four levels of Torah interpretation. Indeed, as the Rebbe shows in the aforementioned ma’amor in the case of Moideh Ani, Chassidus enhances each level and then binds them together, uniting them and allowing to coexist at the same time.
This was really the first observation that “converted” me to Chassidus Chabad: seeing how in his sichos, the Rebbe is able to bridge together distant concepts in Torah that seemingly had little to do with each other, allowing them to co-exist in harmony, despite seeming incompatibility of their levels.
The same idea is regarding revelation of G-d’s Essence in this world that allows contradictory levels of reality coexist in the state of nimna ha’nimnois, coexistence despite the mutual logical contradiction. And, this is what will happen in the Era of Mashiach: G-d Essence will be revealed in all the matter and particular defining aspects of each world. May it happen speedily in our days.
In tractate Kiddushin, Mishna states that a man cannot betroth two sisters at the same time. If one betroths a group of women (e.g., five) at the same time, and amongst them are two sisters, the sisters are not betrothed (even though the other women are). The sisters are not legally betrothed — to the point that if one of them has a child from another man, the child is not a mamzer.
Gemara asks the question: what if the man gives two sisters a gift each and says “You are betrothed to me” to both of them, at the same time? Is one of them betrothed? Should the man write them both a get?
Rava answers, quoting Rabba who said: “What cannot happen in sequence cannot happen even simultaneously”. I.e., if B cannot happen after A, it cannot happen at the same time as A. If A cannot happen after B, it cannot happen at the same time as B. When A and B happen simultaneously, they are negating each other — B is impossible, since it is as if it happened after A, and vice versa.
So, neither of the sisters is betrothed, and a get is not necessary.
* * *
In tractate Nedarim, the question of vow revokation or confirmation is discussed. If a woman makes a vow, her husband or father (depending in whose house she is living at the moment) has to uphold it in order for the vow to be valid or revoke it in order for the vow to become invalid.
What if the husband (or father) says: “I am confirming and revoking the vow at the same time”? Gemara quotes Rabbah again: “Anything that cannot happen in sequence cannot happen simultaneously either”.
Seemingly, the halacha is that since revokation cannot happen after confirmation of the vow (once it’s confirmed, it cannot be revoked) and confirmation cannot happen after revokation (once a vow is revoked, it cannot be confirmed — a new vow needs to be made), the two cancel each other, and the vow is neither confirmed nor revoked.
Rambam, however, rules in Mishnei Toireh:
If he tells her: “It is upheld for you and nullified to you at the same time”, the vow is upheld. If he tells her: “It is upheld to you today”, it is upheld forever. If he tells her: “It is nullified for you tomorrow”, it is not nullified, for he upheld it today and he cannot nullify it on the following day.
What is Rambam doing? Is he contradicting Gemara? If not, how is it possible to reconcile Rambam with the simple reading of Gemara?
Brisker Rav writes in Hilchos Nedarim: The essence of upholding a vow contradicts ability to nullify the vow. Once a vow is upheld, it is legally impossible to nullify it. The essence of revoking the vow, however, does not contradict legally the idea of upholding it; rather, it removes physical posibility of upholding it (by destroying the vow). Therefore, since upholding the law nullified revoking it, but not vice versa, in the case of simultaneous proclamation of upholding and revoking, the law is upheld.
This is different from the case of marrying two sisters. There, the idea of marrying sister A legally contradicts the idea of marrying sister B — and vice versa. Therefore, when an attempt to do both happens, the two attempts are able to legally contradict and nullify each other. In the case of vows, since only one attempt legally contradicts the other, and the second merely physically, circumstantially contradicts the first (as it happens, once a vow is revoked, it stops existing, so there is nothing to uphold), the attempt to revoke does not legally contradict the attempt to uphold, when done simultaneously — and therefore, the halacha is that the vow is upheld.
Why does Gemara bring the opinion of Rabbah then? Exactly to show this principle: things that cannot happen in succession cannot happen simultaneously either. Since revocation cannot happen after confirmation, it cannot happen at the same time either. Therefore, revocation is nullified. Stop. The principle doesn’t go the other way, as one could think from the simple reading. This, says the Brisker Rav, is what Rambam sees as the reason for bringing the opinion of Rabbah.
This sheds light on the first case as well: there, instead of one even (cancellation of both betrothals, to both sisters), two events happen — a cancellation of the betrothal to sister A (by an attempt to betroth sister B) and a cancellation of the betrothal to sister B (ditto).
Rabbi Paltiel: “I am thirty-six years old, and I learn Gemara. And I’ve been learning Gemara since I was nine or ten. It wasn’t until relatively recently that I started to see what I’ve always been brainwashed with. I started to see it — that every single word of Gemara comes from Chumash.”
Listen to the rest here. Very nice shiur on the role of Chassidus in making Torah relevant, comparison of Torah with, lehavdil, science, argument in Torah keeping it true and other good stuff.
Can G-d create a rock He cannot lift? Can impossible things exist? Is G-d limited by logic?
How was it possible for Chanukah oil to be miraculous if kosher oil for menorah has to be natural? If the oil was natural, how did the miracle happen?
For this and much more, for synthesis of deepest Kabbalistic and Chassidic concepts with Halachic questions (posed by no less than Brisker Rav and answered by no less than Lubavitcher Rebbe), listen to this audio-shiur by Rabbi Yossi Paltiel. No knowledge of deep concepts in Judaism necessary.
